CHAPTER IV. BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD

[Footnote 217: F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 209, Confidential, Lyons to Russell, May 23, 1861. A brief "extract" from this despatch was printed in the British Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 48. The "extract" in question consists of two short paragraphs only, printed, without any indication of important elisions, in each of the paragraphs. ]

[Footnote 218: Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 174. ]

[Footnote 219: Lutz, "Notes." The source of Schleiden's information is not given in his despatch. He was intimate with many persons closely in touch with events, especially with Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and with Blair, a member of the Cabinet.]

[Footnote 220: Ibid., Schleiden to Republic of Bremen, May 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 221: Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 179, sets the date as June 8 when Seward's instructions for England and France show that he had "recovered his balance." This is correct for the change in tone of despatches, but the acceptance of Lincoln's policy must have been immediate. C.F. Adams places the date for Seward's complete change of policy much later, describing his "war mania" as lasting until the Northern defeat of Bull Run, July 21. I think this an error, and evidence that it is such appears later in the present chapter. See Charles Francis Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]

[Footnote 222: Russell Papers.]

[Footnote 223: Lyons Papers, May 21, 1861.]

[Footnote 224: Ibid., Russell to Lyons, May 25, 1861.]

[Footnote 225: F.O., Am., Vol. 765, No. 253.]

[Footnote 226: Ibid., No. 263, Lyons to Russell, June 8, 1861.]

[Footnote 227: See ante, p. 106.]

[Footnote 228: See ante, p. 102. Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 181, using Seward's description to Adams (U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2, p. 106) of this interview expands upon the Secretary's skill in thus preventing a joint notification by England and France of their intention to act together. He rightly characterizes Seward's tactics as "diplomatic skill of the best quality." But in Lyons' report the emphasis is placed upon Seward's courtesy in argument, and Lyons felt that the knowledge of British-French joint action had been made sufficiently clear by his taking Mercier with him and by their common though unofficial representation to Seward.]

[Footnote 229: Russell Papers. To Russell.]

[Footnote 230: Ibid, To Russell. Lyons' source of information was not revealed.]

[Footnote 231: Ibid., To Russell.]

[Footnote 232: U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2, p. 110.]

[Footnote 233: Ibid., p. 118. To Adams.]

[Footnote 234: C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris." p. 29, and so argued by the author throughout this monograph. I think this an error.]

[Footnote 235: The Spectator, friend of the North, argued, June 15, 1861, that the Queen's Proclamation was the next best thing for the North to a definite British alliance. Southern privateers could not now be obtained from England. And the United States was surely too proud to accept direct British aid.]