APPENDICES
I
The following telegram was sent by Enver Pasha to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, at Supreme Army Command Headquarters, from Constantinople on August 23, 1917:
The news of the despatch of strong enemy forces to Egypt,
together with the nomination of General Allenby as
Commander-in-Chief
on our Syrian Front, indicates that the
British contemplate an offensive on the Syrian Front, and
very probably before the middle of November.
The preservation of the Sinai Front is a primary condition
to the success of the Yilderim undertaking.
After a further conversation with the Commander of
the IVth Army (Jemal Pasha) I consider it necessary to
strengthen this front by one of the infantry divisions intended
for Yilderim, and to despatch this division immediately
from Aleppo.
With this reinforcement the defence of the Sinai Front
by the IVth Army is assured.
General von Falkenhayn takes up the position that he
does not consider the defence assured, and that the further
reduction of Yilderim forces is to be deprecated under any
circumstances.
He consequently recommends that we on our side should
attack the British, and as far as possible surprise them,
before they are strengthened. He wishes to carry out this
attack with four infantry divisions, and the 'Asia' Corps.
Two of the four infantry divisions have still to be despatched
to the front.
I cannot yet decide to support the proposal, nor need
I do so, as the transport of an infantry division from Aleppo
to Bayak requires twenty days. During this period the
situation as regards the enemy will become clear, and one
will become better able to estimate the chance of success
of an attack.
I must, however, in any case be able to dispose of more
forces than at present, either for the completion of Yilderim,
or for the replacement of the very heavy losses which will
certainly occur in the Syrian attack.
I must consequently reiterate, to my deep regret, my
request for the return of the VIth Army Corps (which was
operating at that time in the Dobrudja) and for the despatch
of this Corps, together with the 20th Infantry Division,
commencing with the 15th Infantry Division.
In my opinion the Army Corps could be replaced by
Bulgarians, whose task is unquestionably being lightened
through the despatch of troops (British) to Egypt.
Should this not be the case, I would be ready to exchange
two divisions from the Vth Army for the two infantry divisions
of the VIth Army Corps, as the former are only suited
for a war of position, and would have to be made mobile
by the allotment of transport and equipment.
If these two infantry divisions were given up, the Vth
Army would have only five infantry divisions of no great
fighting value, a condition of things which is perhaps not
very desirable.
For the moment my decision is: Defence of Syria by
strengthening that front by one infantry division, and
prosecution of the Yilderim scheme.
Should good prospects offer of beating the British decisively
in Syria before they have been reinforced I will take
up General von Falkenhayn's proposal again, as far as it
appears possible to carry it out, having in view the question
of transport and rationing, which still has to be settled in
some respects. - Turkish Main Headquarters, ENVER.
II
Von Falkenhayn despatched the following telegram from Constantinople on August 25, 1917, to German General Headquarters:
The possibility of a British attack in Syria has had to
be taken into consideration from the beginning. Its repercussion
on the Irak undertaking was obvious. On that
account I had already settled in my conversations in
Constantinople
during May that, if the centre of gravity of
operations were transferred to the Sinai Front, command
should be given me there too. The news now to hand - reinforcement
of the British troops in Egypt, taking over
of command by Allenby, the demands of the British Press
daily becoming louder - makes the preparation of a British
attack in Syria probable.
Jemal Pasha wishes to meet it with a defensive. To
that end he demands the divisions and war material which
were being collected about Aleppo for Yilderim. The
natural result of granting this request will be that true
safety will never be attained on the Sinai Front by a pure
defensive, and that the Irak undertaking will certainly
fritter away owing to want of driving power or to delays.
I had consequently proposed to the Turkish Higher
Command to send two divisions and the 'Asia' Corps as
quickly as possible to Southern Syria, so as to carry out
a surprise attack on the British by means of an encircling
movement before the arrival of their reinforcements. Railways
allow of the assembly of these forces (inclusive of heavy
artillery, material and technical stores) in the neighbourhood
of Beersheba by the end of October. The disposable parts
of the IVth Army (two to three divisions) would be added
to it.
In a discussion between Enver, Jemal, and myself, Enver
decided first of all to strengthen the IVth Army by the
inclusion of one division from the Army Group. This
division would suffice to ward off attack. The Irak undertaking
could be carried through at the same time. Judging
from all former experiences I am firmly convinced as soon
as it comes to a question of the expected attack on the
Sinai Front, or even if the IVth Army only feels itself seriously
threatened, further troops, munitions, and material will be
withdrawn from the Army Group, and Turkey's forces will
be shattered.
Then nothing decisive can be undertaken in either theatre
of war. The sacrifice of men, money, and material which
Germany is offering at the present moment will be in vain.
The treatment of the question is rendered all the more
difficult because I cannot rid myself of the impression that
the decision of the Turkish Higher Command is based far
less on military exigencies than on personal motives. It
is dictated with one eye on the mighty Jemal, who deprecates
a definite decision, but yet on the other hand opposes the
slightest diminution of the area of his command.
Consequently as the position now stands, I consider the
Irak undertaking practicable only if it is given the necessary
freedom for retirement through the removal of the danger
on the Syrian Front. The removal of this danger I regard
as only possible through attack. V. FALKENHAYN.
III
Here is another German estimate of the position created by our War Cabinet's decision to take the offensive in Palestine, and in considering the view of the German Staff and the prospect of success any Turkish attack would have, it must be borne in mind that under the most favourable circumstances the enemy could not have been in position for taking an offensive before the end of October. Von Falkenhayn wished to attack the British 'before the arrival of their reinforcements.' Not only had our reinforcements arrived before the end of October, but they were all in position and the battle had commenced. Beersheba was taken on October 31. This appreciation was written by Major von Papen of Yilderim headquarters on August 28, 1917:
Enver's objections, the improbability of attaining a
decisive result on the Sinai Front with two divisions plus
the 'Asia Corps' and the difficulty of the Aleppo-Rayak
transport question, hold good.
The execution of the offensive with stronger forces is
desirable, but is not practicable, as, in consequence of the
beginning of the rainy weather in the middle of November,
the British offensive may be expected at the latest during
the latter half of October; ours therefore should take place
during the first part of that month.
The transport question precludes the assembly of stronger
forces by that date.
Should the idea of an offensive be abandoned altogether
on that account?
On the assumption that General Allenby - after the two
unsuccessful British attacks - will attack only with a marked
superiority of men and munitions, a passive defence on a
thirty-five kilometre front with an exposed flank does not
appear to offer any great chance of success.
The conditions on the Western Front (defensive zone,
attack divisions) are only partially applicable here, since
the mobility of the artillery and the correct tactical handling
of the attack division are not assured. The intended passive
defensive will not be improved by the theatrical attack with
one division suggested by General von Kress.
On the contrary this attack would be without result, as
it would be carried out too obliquely to the front, and would
only mean a sacrifice of men and material.
The attack proposed by His Excellency for the envelopment
of the enemy's flank - if carried out during the first
half of October with four divisions plus the 'Asia Corps' - will
perhaps have no definite result, but will at all events
result in this: that the Gaza Front flanked by the sea
will tie down considerable forces and defer the continuation
of British operations in the wet season, during which, in
the opinion of General von Kress, they cannot be carried
on with any prospect of success.
The situation on the Sinai Front will then be clear. Naturally
it is possible that the position here may demand the
inclusion of further effectives and the Yilderim operation
consequently become impracticable. This, however, will
only prove that the determining factor of the decisive operation
for Turkey during the winter of 1917-1918 lies in Palestine
and not in Mesopotamia. An offensive on the Sinai
Front is therefore - even with reduced forces and a limited
objective - the correct solution.
PAPEN.
IV
Letter from General Kress von Kressenstein to Yilderim headquarters, dated September 29, 1917, on moral of Turkish troops.
A question which urgently needs regulating is that of deserters. According to my experience their number will increase still more with the setting in of the bad weather and the deterioration of rations.
Civil administration and the gendarmerie fail entirely; they often have a secret understanding with the population and are open to bribery.
The cordon drawn by me is too weak to prevent desertion. I am also too short of troops to have the necessary raids undertaken in the hinterland. It is necessary that the hunt for deserters in the area between the front and the line Jerusalem-Ramleh-Jaffa be formally organised under energetic management, that one or two squadrons exclusively for this service be detailed, and that a definite reward be paid for bringing in each deserter. But above all it is necessary that punishment should follow in consequence, and that the unfortunately very frequent amnesties of His Majesty the Sultan be discontinued, at least for some time.
The question of rationing has not been settled. We are living continually from hand to mouth. Despite the binding promises of the Headquarters IVth Army, the Vali of Damascus, the Lines of Communication, Major Bathmann and others, that from now on 150 tons of rations should arrive regularly each day, from the 24th to the 27th of this month, for example a total of 229 tons or only 75 tons per diem have arrived.
I cannot fix the blame for these irregularities. The Headquarters IVth Army has received the highly gratifying order that, at least up to the imminent decisive battle, the bread ration is raised to 100 grammes. This urgently necessary improvement of the men's rations remains illusory, if a correspondingly larger quantity of flour (about one wagon per day) is not supplied to us. So far the improvement exists only on paper. The condition of the animals particularly gives cause for anxiety. Not only are we about 6000 animals short of establishment, but as a result of exhaustion a considerable number of animals are ruined daily. The majority of divisions are incapable of operating on account of this shortage of animals. The ammunition supply too is gradually coming into question on account of the deficiency in animals. The menacing danger can only be met by a regular supply of sufficient fodder. The stock of straw in the area of operations is exhausted. With gold some barley can still be bought in the country.
Every year during the rainy season the railway is interrupted again and again for periods of from eight to fourteen days. There are also days and weeks in which the motor-lorry traffic has to be suspended. Finally we must calculate on the possibility of an interruption of our rear communications by the enemy. I therefore consider it absolutely necessary that at least a fourteen days' reserve of rations be deposited in the depots at the front as early as possible.
The increase of troops on the Sinai Front necessitates a very considerable increase on the supply of meat from the Line of Communication area, Damascus district.
V
The troops of General Allenby's Army before the attack on Beersheba were distributed as follows:
XXTH CORPS.
10th Division.
29th Brigade. 30th Brigade. 31st Brigade.
6th R. Irish Rifles. 1st R. Irish Regt. 5th R. Inniskillings. 5th Con. Rangers. 6th R. Munst. Fus. 6th R. Inniskillings. 6th Leinsters. 6th R. Dublin Fus. 2nd R. Irish Fus. 1st Leinsters 7th R. Dublin Fus. 5th R. Irish Rifles.
53rd Division.
158th Brigade. 159th Brigade. 160th Brigade.
1/5th R. Welsh Fus. 1/4th Cheshires. 1/4th R. Sussex. 1/6th " 1/7th " 2/4th R. West Surrey. 1/7th " 1/4th Welsh 2/4th R. West Kent. 1/1st Hereford. 1/5th " 2/10th Middlesex.
60th Division.
179th Brigade. 180th Brigade. 181st Brigade.
2/13th London. 2/17th London. 2/21st London. 2/14th " 2/18th " 2/22nd " 2/15th " 2/19th " 2/23rd " 2/16th " 2/20th " 2/24th "
74th Division.
229th Brigade. 230th Brigade. 231st Brigade.
16th Devons (1st 10th E. Kent (R.E. 10th Shrop. (Shrop.
Devon &R.N. Kent &W. Kent &Cheshire Yeo.).
Devon Yeo.). Yeo.). 12th Somerset L.I. 16th R. Sussex 24th R.
Welsh Fus.
(Yeo.). (Yeo.). (Denbigh Yeo.). 14th R. Highrs.(Fife 15th Suffolk
(Yeo.) 25th R. Welsh Fus.
&Forfar Yeo.). (Montgomery Yeo.
&Welsh Horse). 12th R. Scots Fus. 12th Norfolk
(Yeo.) 24th Welsh Regt.
(Ayr &Lanark (Pembroke &Glanmorgan
Yeo.). Yeo.).
XXIst CORPS.
52nd (Lowland) Division.
155th Brigade. 156th Brigade. 157th Brigade.
l/4th R. Scots Fus. 1/4th Royal Scots. 1/5th H.L.I. l/5th R. Scots Fus. 1/7th Royal Scots. 1/6th H.L.I. l/4th K.O.S.B. 1/7th Scot. Rifles. 1/7th H.L.I. l/5th K.O.S.B. 1/8th Scot. Rifles. 1/5th A. &S. Highrs.
54th (East Anglian) Division.
161th Brigade. 162th Brigade. 163th Brigade.
l/4th Essex. 1/5th Bedfords. 1/4th Norfolk. l/5th Essex. 1/4th Northants. 1/5th Norfolk. l/6th Essex. 1/10th London. 1/5th Suffolk. l/7th Essex. 1/11th London. 1/8th Hampshire.
75th Division.
232th Brigade. 233th Brigade. 234th Brigade.
1/5th Devon. 1/5th Somersets. 1/4th D.C.L.I. 2/5th Hampshire. 1/4th Wilts. 2/4th Dorsets. 2/4th Somersets. 2/4th Hampshire. 123rd Rifles. 2/3rd Gurkhas. 3/3rd Gurkhas. 58th Rifles.
DESERT MOUNTED CORPS.
Anzac Mounted Division.
1st A.L.H. Bde. 2nd A.L.H. Bde. N.Z. Mtd. Rifles Bde.
1st A.L.H. Regt. 5th A.L.H. Regt. Auckland M. Rifles. 2nd A.L.H. Regt. 6th A.L.H. Regt. Canterbury M. Rifles. 3rd A.L.H. Regt. 7th A.L.H. Regt. Wellington M. Rifles.
Australian Mounted Division.
3rd L.H. Brigade. 4th L.H. Brigade. 5th Mtd. Brigade.. 8th A.L.H. Regt. 4th A.L.H. Regt. 1/1st Warwick Yeo. 9th " 11th " 1/1st Gloucester Yeo. 10th " 12th " 1/1st Worcester Yeo.
Yoemanry Mounted Division
6th Mtd. Brigade. 8th Mtd. Brigade. 22nd Mtd. Brigade. 1/1st Bucks Hussars. 1/1st City of London 1/1st Lincolnshire Yeo. Yeo. 1/1st Berkshire Yeo. 1/1st Co. of London 1/1st Staffordshire Yeo. Yeo. 1/1st Dorset Yeo. l/3rd Co. of London 1/1st E. Riding Yeo. Yeo.
7th Mounted Brigade (attached Desert Corps).
1/1st Sherwood Rangers. 1/1st South Notts Hussars.
Imperial Camel Brigade.
VI
There can be no better illustration of how one battle worked out 'according to plan' than the quotation of the following Force Order:
FORCE ORDER
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
22nd October 1917.
It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to take the
offensive against the enemy at Gaza and at Beersheba, and
when Beersheba is in our hands to make an enveloping
attack on the enemy's left flank in the direction of Sheria
and Hareira.
On Zero day XXth Corps with the 10th Division and
Imperial Camel Brigade attached and the Desert Mounted
Corps less one Mounted Division and the Imperial Camel
Brigade will attack the enemy at Beersheba with the object
of gaining possession of that place by nightfall.
As soon as Beersheba is in our hands and the necessary
arrangements have been made for the restoration of the
Beersheba water supply, XXth Corps and Desert Mounted
Corps complete will move rapidly forward to attack the
left of the enemy's main position with the object of driving
him out of Sheria and Hareira and enveloping the left flank
of his army. XXth Corps will move against the enemy's
defences south of Sheria, first of all against the Kauwukah
line and then against Sheria and the Hareira defences.
Desert Mounted Corps calling up the Mounted Division left
in general reserve during the Beersheba operation will move
north of the XXth Corps to gain possession of Nejile and of
any water supplies between that place and the right of
XXth Corps and will be prepared to operate vigorously
against and round the enemy's left flank if he should throw
it back to oppose the advance of the XXth Corps.
On a date to be subsequently determined and which will
probably be after the occupation of Beersheba and 24 to
48 hours before the attack of XXth Corps on the Kauwukah
line, the XXIst Corps will attack the south-west defences
of Gaza with the object of capturing the enemy's front-line
system from Umbrella Hill to Sheikh Hasan, both inclusive.
The Royal Navy will co-operate with the XXIst Corps
in the attack on Gaza and in any subsequent operations
that may be undertaken by XXIst Corps.
On Z - 4 day the G.O.C. XXIst Corps will open a systematic
bombardment of the Gaza defences, increasing in volume
from Z - 1 day to Zx2 day and to be continued until Zx4
day at the least.
The Royal Navy will co-operate as follows: On Z - 1 and
Zero days two 6-inch monitors will be available for bombardment
from the sea, special objective Sheikh Hasan.
On Zero day a third 6-inch monitor will be available so that
two of these ships may be constantly in action while one
replenishes ammunition. On Zxl day 6-inch monitors will
discontinue their bombardment which they will reopen
on Zx2 day. From Zxl day the French battleship Requin
and H.M.S. Raglan will bombard Deir Sineid station and
junction for Huj, the roads and railway bridges and camps
on the wadi Hesi and the neighbourhood. The Requin and
Raglan will be assisted by a seaplane carrier.
From Zero day one 92 monitor will be available from
dawn, special objective Sheikh Redwan.
From Z - 1 day inclusive demands for naval co-operation
will be conveyed direct from G.O.C. XXIst Corps to the
Senior Naval Officer, Marine View, who will arrange for
the transmission of the demands so made.
XXth Corps will move into position during the night of
Z-l=Zero day so as to attack the enemy at Beersheba on
Zero day south of the wadi Saba with two divisions while
covering his flank and the construction of the railway
east of Shellal with one division on the high ground overlooking
the wadis El Sufi and Hanafish. The objective of XXth Corps
will be the enemy's works west and south-west
of Beersheba as far as the Khalasa-Beersheba road
inclusive.
Desert Mounted Corps will move on the night of Z-1=Zero
day from the area of concentration about Khalasa and
Asluj so as to co-operate with XXth Corps by attacking
Beersheba with two divisions and one mounted brigade.
The objective of Desert Mounted Corps will be the enemy's
defences from south-east to the north-east of Beersheba
and the town of Beersheba itself.
The G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will endeavour to turn
the enemy's left with a view to breaking down his
resistance at Beersheba as quickly as possible. With this
in view the main weight of his force will be directed against
Beersheba from the east and north-east. As soon as the
enemy's resistance shows signs of weakening the G.O.C.
Desert Mounted Corps will be prepared to act with the utmost
vigour against his retreating troops so as to prevent their
escape, or at least to drive them well beyond the high ground
immediately overlooking the town from the north. He
will also be prepared to push troops rapidly into Beersheba
in order to protect from danger any wells and plant connected
with the water supply not damaged by the enemy before
Beersheba is entered.
The Yeomanry Mounted Division will pass from the
command of the G.O.C. XXth Corps at five on Zero day
and will come directly under General Headquarters as part
of the general reserve in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.
When Beersheba has been taken the G.O.C. XXth Corps
will push forward covering troops to the high ground north
of the town to protect it from any counter movement on
the part of the enemy. He will also put in hand the restoration
of the water supply in Beersheba. The G.O.C. Desert
Mounted Corps will be responsible for the protection of
the town from the north-east and east.
As soon as possible after the taking of Beersheba the
G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will report to G.H.Q. on the
water supplies in the wells and wadis east of Beersheba and
especially along the wadi Saba and the Beersheba-Tel-el-Nulah
road. If insufficient water is found to exist in this
area G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will send back such of
his troops as may be necessary to watering places from which
he started or which may be found in the country east of
the Khalasa-Beersheba road during the operations.
A preliminary survey having been made, the G.O.C. XXth
Corps will report by wire to G.H.Q. on the condition of the
wells and water supply generally in Beersheba and on any
water supplies found west and north-west of that place.
He will telegraph an estimate as soon as it can be made
of the time required to place the Beersheba water supply
in working order.
When the situation as regards water at Beersheba has
become clear so that the movement of XXth Corps and
Desert Mounted Corps against the left flank of the enemy's
main position can be arranged, the G.O.C. XXIst Corps
will be ordered to attack the enemy's defences south-west
of Gaza in time for this operation to be carried out prior
to the attack of XXth Corps on the Kauwukah line of works.
The objective of XXIst Corps will be the defences of Gaza
from Umbrella Hill inclusive to the sea about Sheikh Hasan.
Instructions in regard to the following have been issued
separate to all corps:
Amount of corps artillery allotted.
Amount of ammunition put on corps charge prior to operations.
Amount of ammunition per gun that will be delivered daily
at respective railheads and the day of commencement.
Amount of transport allotted for forward supply from
railheads.
The general average for one day's firing has been calculated
on the following basis:
Field and mountain guns and
mountain howitzers ...150 rounds per gun.
4.5-inch howitzers....120 rounds per gun.
60-pounders and 6-inch howitzers. 90 rounds per gun.
8-inch howitzers and 6-inch Mark VII. 60 rounds per gun.
This average expenditure will only be possible in the
XXIst Corps up to Zx16 day and for the Desert Mounted
Corps and XXth Corps to Zx13. After these dates if the
average has been expended the daily average will have to
drop to the basis of 100 rounds per 18-pounder per day and
other natures in proportion.
AIRCRAFT, ARMY WING. - Strategical reconnaissance including
the reconnaissance of areas beyond the tactical zone
and in which the enemy's main reserves are located, also
distant photography and aerial offensive, will be carried out
by an Army squadron under instructions issued direct from
G.H.Q. Protection from hostile aircraft will be the main
duty of the Army fighting squadron. A bombing squadron
will be held in readiness for any aerial offensive which the
situation may render desirable.
CORPS SQUADRONS. - Two Corps squadrons will undertake
artillery co-operation, contact patrols, and tactical
reconnaissance
for the Corps to which they are attached. In the
case of the Desert Mounted Corps one flight from the Corps
squadron attached to XXth Corps will be responsible for
the above work. Photography of trench areas will normally
be carried out daily by the Army Wing.
VII
ORDERS FOR THE OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO JERUSALEM
1. The Commander-in-Chief will enter Jerusalem by the Bab-el-Khalil (Jaffa Gate) at 12 noon, 11th December 1917. The order of procession is shown below:
Two Aides-de-camp.
(Twenty paces.) O.C. Italian Palestine
Commander-in-Chief. O.C. French Palestine Contingent(Col. Contingent
Dagostino). (Col. Piepape). Staff Officer. Two Staff Officers. Staff
Officer.
(Ten paces.)
M. Picot (Head of French Mission). French Mil.
Brig.-Gen. Italian Mil. Att. American Att. (Capt. Clayton. (Major
Caccia). Mil. Att. St. Quentin). (Col. Davis).
(Five paces.)
Chief of General Staff (Maj.-Gen. Sir L.J. Bols).
Brig.-General General Staff (Brig.-Gen. G. Dawnay).
(Five paces.)
G.O.C. XXth Corps, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Philip W. Chetwode,
Bart., D.S.O.
Staff Officer. Brig.-Gen. Bartholomew.
(Ten paces.)
British Guard.
Australian and New Zealand Guard.
French Guard.
Italian Guard.
2. GUARDS. - The following guards will be found by XXth Corps:
Outside the Gate -
British Guard: Fifty of all ranks, including English, Scottish,
Irish, and Welsh troops.
Australian and New Zealand Guard: Fifty of all ranks, including
twenty New Zealand troops.
These guards will be drawn up facing each other, the right
flank of the British guard and the left flank Australian guard
resting on the City Wall. The O.C. British guard will be in
command of both guards and will give the words of command.
Inside the Gate -
French Guard: Twenty of all ranks.
Italian Guard: Twenty of all ranks.
These guards will be drawn up facing each other, the left flank
of the French guard and the right flank of the Italian guard
resting on the City Wall.
3. SALUTE. - On the approach of the Commander-in-Chief, guards will come to the Salute and present arms.
4. The Military Governor of the City will meet the Commander-in-Chief at the Gate at 12 noon.
5. ROUTE. - The procession will proceed via Sueikat Allah and El Maukaf Streets to the steps of El Kala (Citadel), where the notables of the City under the guidance of a Staff Officer of the Governor will meet the Commander-in-Chief and the Proclamation will be read to the citizens. The British, Australian and New Zealand, French and Italian guards will, when the procession has passed them, take their place in column of fours in the rear of the procession in that order.
On arrival at El Kala the guards will form up facing steps on the opposite (i.e. east) side of El Maukaf Street, the British guard being thus on the left, Italian guard on the right of the line, and remain at the slope. The British and Italian guards will bring up their left and right flanks respectively across the street south and north of El Kala.
On leaving the Citadel the procession will proceed in the same order as before to the Barrack Square, where the Commander-in-Chief will confer with the notables of the City. On entering the Barrack Square the guards will wheel to the left and, keeping the left-hand man of each section of fours next the side of the Barrack Square, march round until the rear of the Italian guard has entered the Square, when the guards will halt, right turn (so as to face the centre of the Square), and remain at the slope.
The procession will leave the City by the same route as it entered and in the same order.
As the Commander-in-Chief and procession move off to leave the Barrack Square the guards will present arms, and then move off and resume their places in the procession, the British guard leading.
On arrival at the Jaffa Gate the guards will take up their original positions, and on the Commander-in-Chief's departure will be marched away under the orders of the G.O.C. XXth Corps.
6. POLICE, etc. - The Military Governor of the City will arrange for policing the route of the procession and for the searching of houses on either side of the route. He will also arrange for civil officials to read the Proclamation at El Kala.
VIII
The Proclamation read from the steps of David's Tower on the occasion of the Commander-in-Chief's Official Entry into Jerusalem was in these terms:
To the inhabitants of Jerusalem the Blessed and the people
dwelling
in its vicinity:
The defeat inflicted upon the Turks by the troops under
my command has resulted in the occupation of your City
by my forces. I therefore here and now proclaim it to be
under martial law, under which form of administration it
will remain as long as military considerations make it
necessary.
However, lest any of you should be alarmed by reason of
your experiences at the hands of the enemy who has retired,
I hereby inform you that it is my desire that every person
should pursue his lawful business without fear of interruption.
Furthermore, since your City is regarded with affection by
the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind, and
its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages
of multitudes of devout people of those three religions for
many centuries, therefore do I make it known to you that
every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional
site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place
of prayer, of whatsoever form of the three religions, will be
maintained and protected according to the existing customs
and beliefs of those to whose faiths they are sacred.
IX
No story of the capture of Jerusalem would be complete without the tribute paid by General Allenby to his gallant troops of all arms. The Commander-in-Chief's thanks, which were conveyed to the troops in a Special Order of the Day, were highly appreciated by all ranks. The document ran as follows:
SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY
G.H.Q., E.E.P.,
15th December 1917.
With the capture of Jerusalem another phase of the
operations of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force has been
victoriously concluded.
The Commander-in-Chief desires to thank all ranks of all
the units and services in the Force for the magnificent work
which has been accomplished.
In forty days many strong Turkish positions have been
captured and the Force has advanced some sixty miles on a
front of thirty miles.
The skill, gallantry, and determination of all ranks have
led to this result.
1. The approach marches of the Desert Mounted Corps
and the XXth Corps (10th, 53rd, 60th, and 74th Divisions),
followed by the dashing attacks of the 60th and 74th Divisions
and the rapid turning movement of the Desert Mounted
Corps, ending in the fine charge of the 4th Australian Light
Horse Brigade, resulted in the capture of Beersheba with
many prisoners and guns.
2. The stubborn resistance of the 53rd Division, units of
the Desert Mounted Corps and Imperial Camel Brigade in
the difficult country north-east of Beersheba enabled the
preparations of the XXth Corps to be completed without
interference, and enabled the Commander-in-Chief to carry
out his plan without diverting more than the intended
number of troops to protect the right flank, despite the many
and strong attacks of the enemy.
3. The attack of the XXth Corps (10th, 60th, and 74th
Divisions), prepared with great skill by the Corps and Divisional
Commanders and carried out with such dash and
courage by the troops, resulted in the turning of the Turkish
left flank and in an advance to the depth of nine miles through
an entrenched position defended by strong forces.
In this operation the Desert Mounted Corps, covering the
right flank and threatening the Turkish rear, forced the
Turks to begin a general retreat of their left flank.
4. The artillery attack of the XXIst Corps and of the
ships of the Royal Navy, skilfully arranged and carried out
with great accuracy, caused heavy loss to the enemy in the
Gaza sector of his defences. The success of this bombardment
was due to the loyal co-operation of the Rear-Admiral
S.N.O. Egypt and Red Sea, and the officers of the Royal
Navy, the careful preparation of plans by the Rear-Admiral
and the G.O.C. XXIst Corps, and the good shooting of the
Royal Navy, and of the heavy, siege, and field artillery of
the XXIst Corps.
5. The two attacks on the strong defences of Gaza, carried
out by the 52nd and 54th Divisions, were each completely
successful, thanks to the skill with which they were thought
out and prepared by the G.O.C. XXIst Corps, the Divisional
Commanders and the Brigade Commanders, and the great
gallantry displayed by the troops who carried out these
attacks.
6. The second attack resulted in the evacuation of Gaza
by the enemy and the turning of his right flank. The 52nd
and 75th Divisions at once began a pursuit which carried
them in three weeks from Gaza to within a few miles of
Jerusalem.
7. This pursuit, carried out by the Desert Mounted Corps
and these two Divisions of the XXIst Corps, first over the
sandhills of the coast, then over the Plains of Palestine and
the foothills, and finally in the rocky mountains of Judea,
required from all commanders rapid decisions and powers
to adapt their tactics to varying conditions of ground. The
troops were called upon to carry out very long marches in
great heat without water, to make attacks on stubborn
rearguards without time for reconnaissance, and finally to
suffer cold and privation in the mountains.
In these great operations Commanders carried out their
plans with boldness and determination, and the troops of all
arms and services responded with a devotion and gallantry
beyond praise.
8. The final operations of the XXth Corps which resulted
in the surrender of Jerusalem were a fitting climax to the
efforts of all ranks.
The attack skilfully prepared by the G.O.C. XXth Corps
and carried out with precision, endurance, and gallantry
by the troops of the 53rd, 60th, and 74th Divisions, over
country of extreme difficulty in wet weather, showed skill
in leading and gallantry and determination of a very high
order.
9. Throughout the operations the Royal Flying Corps
have rendered valuable assistance to all arms and have
obtained complete mastery of the air. The information
obtained from contact and reconnaissance patrols has at
all times enabled Commanders to keep in close touch with
the situation. In the pursuit they have inflicted severe
loss on the enemy, and their artillery co-operation has
contributed
in no small measure to our victory.
10. The organisation in rear of the fighting forces enabled
these forces to be supplied throughout. All supply and
ammunition services and engineer services were called upon
for great exertions. The response everywhere showed great
devotion and high military spirit.
11. The thorough organisation of the lines of communication,
and the energy and skill with which all the services
adapted themselves to the varying conditions of the operations,
ensured the constant mobility of the fighting
troops.
12. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the admirable
conduct of all the transport services, and particularly the
endurance and loyal service of the Camel Transport Corps.
13. The skill and energy by which the Signal Service was
maintained under all conditions reflects the greatest credit
on all concerned.
14. The Medical Service was able to adapt itself to all
the difficulties of the situation, with the result the evacuation
of wounded and sick was carried out with the least possible
hardship or discomfort.
15. The Veterinary Service worked well throughout; the
wastage in animals was consequently small considering the
distances traversed.
16. The Ordnance Service never failed to meet all demands.
17. The work of the Egyptian Labour Corps has been of
the greatest value in contributing to the rapid advance of
the troops and in overcoming the difficulties of the
communications.
18. The Commander-in-Chief desires that his thanks and
appreciation of their services be conveyed to all officers and
men of the force which he has the honour to command.
G. DAWNAY, B.G.G.S.,
for Major-General, Chief of the General Staff, E.E.F.
X
The men of units forming the XXth Corps were deeply gratified to receive this commendation from their gallant Corps Commander:
SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY
BY
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR PHILIP W. CHETWODE, BT.,
K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., commanding XXth Corps
HEADQUARTERS, XXTH CORPS,
13th December 1917.
Now that the efforts of General Sir E.H.H. Allenby's
Army have been crowned by the capture of Jerusalem, I
wish to express to all ranks, services, and departments of the
XXth Army Corps my personal thanks and my admiration
for the soldierly qualities they have displayed.
I have served as a regimental officer in two campaigns,
and no one knows better than I do what the shortness of
food, the fatigue of operating among high mountains, and
the cold and wet has meant to the fighting troops. But in
spite of it all, and at the moment when the weather was
at its worst, they responded to my call and drove the
enemy in one rush through his last defences and beyond
Jerusalem.
A fine performance, and I am intensely proud of having
had the honour of commanding such a body of men.
I wish to give special praise to the Divisional Ammunition
Columns, Divisional Trains A.S.C., Supply Services, Mechanical
Transport personnel, Camel Transport personnel, and to
the Royal Army Medical Corps and all services whose continuous
labour, day and night, almost without rest, alone
enabled the fighting troops to do what they did.
SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY
HEADQUARTERS, XXTH CORPS,
31-st December 1917.
I have again to thank the XXth Corps and to express to
them my admiration of their bravery and endurance during
the three days' fighting on December 27, 28, and 29.
The enemy made a determined attempt with two corps
to retake Jerusalem, and while their finest assault troops
melted away before the staunch defence of the 53rd and
60th Divisions, the 10th and 74th were pressing forward
over the most precipitous country, brushing aside all opposition
in order to relieve the pressure on our right.
Their efforts were quickly successful, and by the evening
of the 27th we had definitely regained the initiative, and
I was able to order a general advance.
The final result of the three days' fighting was a gain to
us of many miles and extremely heavy losses to the enemy.
A fine three days' work.