CHAPTER XI. RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN

The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of governmental inclination to act in the American Civil War was accepted by most of the British public as evidence that the Ministry had no intentions in that direction. But keen observers were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna, was keeping close touch with the situation in England through private correspondence. In March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have made their minds up to await the issue of the present campaign" - meaning McClellan's advance on Richmond[734]. With the failure of that campaign he wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his [Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not last long[735]." Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, The Index, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom and necessity of British action to end the war[736]. France was declared rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the expense of England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on grounds of close sympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation, at first objected to, in view of the more reasonable demand for recognition, was in the end the chief object of The Index, after mid-July, when simple recognition seemed impossible of attainment[737]. Especially British humiliation because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any public manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great detail[738].

The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of The Index are, however, no indication that either Northern fears or Southern hopes were based on authoritative information as to governmental purpose. The plan now in the minds of Palmerston and Russell and their steps in furthering it have been the subject of much historical study and writing. It is here proposed to review them in the light of all available important materials, both old and new, using a chronological order and with more citation than is customary, in the belief that such citations best tell the story of this, the most critical period in the entire course of British attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, Great Britain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the American conflict[739].

Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18, and the Prime Minister's comments did not indicate safety for the North stood Adams, the American Minister. Of Palmerston's speech he wrote the next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enough could be gathered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape will only be averted by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts. The anxiety attending my responsibility is only postponed[740]." At this very moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for the South - the famous Alabama - which was soon completed and put to sea but ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in enforcing British neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing the latter's fears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to Seward. On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2, outlining the exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British policy should occur. As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to Congress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat discursive essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom of such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests. It does not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had given serious consideration to the supposed danger[741]. But this conveys a very erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the despatch very specifically and in a very serious tone, instructs Adams that if approached by the British Government with propositions implying a purpose:

     "To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit 
     or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to 
     debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or 
     transmit, any communication of the kind.... If you are asked 
     an opinion what reception the President would give to such a 
     proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are not 
     instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it 
     would be entertained."

This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in conjunction with other Powers. Further, if the South should be "acknowledged" Adams was immediately to suspend his functions. "You will perceive," wrote Seward, "that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis with the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us[742]."

This serious and definite determination by the North to resent any intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln were fully committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling. Briefly, if the need arose, the North would go to war with Europe. Adams at least now knew where he stood and could but await the result. The instruction he held in reserve, nor was it ever officially communicated to Russell. He did, however, state its tenor to Forster who had contacts with the Cabinet through Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that the American determination was communicated to the Ministry, the presumption is that this occurred[743]. Such communication could not have taken place before the end of August and possibly was not then made owing to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation and that, apparently, the plan to move soon in the American War was as yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell.

Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of their determination[744]. Meanwhile they were depending much upon advices from Washington for the exact moment. Stuart was suggesting, with Mercier, that October should be selected[745], and continued his urgings even though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to him from London strong personal objections to any European intervention whatever and especially any by Great Britain[746]. Lyons explained his objections to Russell as well, but Stuart, having gone to the extent of consulting also with Stoeckl, the Russian Minister at Washington, was now in favour of straight-out recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This, thought Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an attempt at mediation[747]. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a full month in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue an emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence of Seward[748], but he attached no importance to this, regarding it as at best a measure of pretence intended to frighten the South and to influence foreign governments[749]. Russell was not impressed with Stuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I think," he wrote, "we must allow the President to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason[750]." But this did not imply that Russell was wavering in the idea that October would be a "ripe time." Soon he was journeying to the Continent in attendance on the Queen and using his leisure to perfect his great plan[751].

Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13. On that date he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound Thouvenel, privately[752], and the day following he wrote to Palmerston commenting on the news just received of the exploits of Stonewall Jackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end the war. In October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet[753]." Similar reactions were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for the same reasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14:

     "The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even 
     Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the 
     Confederates."

     "If this should happen, would it not be time for us to 
     consider whether in such a state of things England and France 
     might not address the contending parties and recommend an 
     arrangement upon the basis of separation[754]?"

Russell replied:

     "... I agree with you that the time is come for offering 
     mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the 
     recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree 
     further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to 
     recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For 
     the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must 
     have a meeting, of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit 
     me for the meeting[755]."

The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result of the unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest. This, considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously made by Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that he had held a long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the subject of mediation as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and found a disposition "to wait to see the result of the elections" in the North. Mercier apparently had been writing that Southern successes would strengthen the Northern peace party. Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party gains the ascendant," Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far committed to listen to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set aside." He also emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France might expect if they recognized the South.

     "I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation, 
     and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and 
     let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the 
     recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such 
     recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it."

     Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.

     "...the French Government had some time back sounded that of 
     Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of 
     mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal...."

     "It appears also that there is less public pressure here for 
     the recognition of the South than there is in England[756]."

Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russell had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight than formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known difference on American policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-grounded conviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will, if only England would give the signal. The second circumstance was still more important. It was already known through the French press that a sharp conflict had arisen in the Government as to Italian policy and all signs pointed to a reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude Thouvenel. Under these circumstances Russell could well afford to discount Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to go - much beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently in Cowley's mind - is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26.

     "I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough 
     for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which 
     Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the 
     interval between this time and the middle of next month. 
     These views had the offer of mediation to both parties in the 
     first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to 
     recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of 
     separation and recognition accompanied by a declaration of 
     neutrality[757]."

The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a communication to Palmerston of Cowley's report together with a memorandum, proposed to be sent to Cowley, but again privately[758], addressed to France alone. Russell here also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen. "She only wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I said that should be done, but we must consult France first." Also enclosed was a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as just returned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not taken of the present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's mind, Europe would have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of the North[759]. Russell was now at home again and the next day Palmerston approved the plans as "excellent"; but he asked whether it would not be well to include Russia in the invitation as a compliment, even though "she might probably decline." As to the other European powers the matter could wait for an "after communication." Yet that Palmerston still wished to go slowly is shown by a comment on the military situation in America:

     "It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the 
     north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great 
     effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a 
     great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and 
     the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other 
     hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and 
     see what may follow[760]...."

Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to France in Russell's proposed memorandum and the communication to Cowley had not been sent off immediately - as the letter to Gladstone of September 26 indicates. But the plan was regarded as so far determined upon that on September 24 Russell requested Lyons not to fix, as yet, upon a date for his departure for America, writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out for an opportunity to offer mediation, and this time he is not so much out in his reckoning[761]." Curiously Mercier had again changed his mind and now thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move, being "particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the word separation," but of this Russell had, as yet, no inkling[762]. With full approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote to Gladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete agreement that an offer of mediation should be made by the three maritime powers, but that "no actual step would be taken without the sanction of the Cabinet[763]." Two days later Russell explained to Gladstone the exact nature of the proposal[764], but that there was even now no thoroughly worked out agreement on the sequence of steps necessary is shown by Palmerston's letter to Gladstone of the twenty-fourth, in which is outlined a preliminary proposal of an armistice, cessation of blockade, and negotiation on the basis of separation[765].

Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the proposed overture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that there would be opposition. Granville had replaced Russell in attendance upon the Queen at Gotha. He now addressed a long and careful argument to Russell opposing the adventure, as he thought it, summing up his opinion in this wise:

     "...I doubt, if the war continues long after our recognition 
     of the South, whether it will be possible for us to avoid 
     drifting into it."

     "...I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to 
     depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you 
     and Lord Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong 
     antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South, 
     and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such 
     general approval from Parliament, the press, and the 
     public[766]."

But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few days later he wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley:

     "I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it 
     decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to 
     do so! Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it; 
     and probably Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It 
     appears to me a great mistake[767]."

Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter there now arrived confused accounts from America of the battles about Washington and of a check to the Southern advance. On September 17 there had been fought the battle of Antietam and two days later Lee, giving up his Maryland campaign, began a retreat through the Shenandoah valley toward the old defensive Southern lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, for McClellan, again briefly in command, thought his army too shattered for an advance. Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory and was now doubtful whether the time had come after all for European overtures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell:

     "MY DEAR RUSSELL,

     "I return you Granville's letter which contains much 
     deserving of serious consideration. There is no doubt that 
     the offer of Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be 
     accepted by the South. Why should it not be accepted? It 
     would give the South in principle the points for which they 
     are fighting. The refusal, if refusal there was, would come 
     from the North, who would be unwilling to give up the 
     principle for which they have been fighting so long as they 
     had a reasonable expectation that by going on fighting they 
     could carry their point. The condition of things therefore 
     which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be 
     great success of the South against the North. That state of 
     things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has 
     been lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course 
     of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about 
     to follow. Ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer 
     light upon future prospects.

     "As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns 
     following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the 
     South, it is quite true that we should have less to care 
     about that resentment in the spring when communication with 
     Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily 
     operate upon the American coast, than in winter when we are 
     cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so safe.

     "But if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time 
     by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would 
     probably not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like 
     one against a European Confederation. Such a quarrel would 
     render certain and permanent that Southern Independence the 
     acknowledgment of which would have caused it.

     "The first communication to be made by England and France to 
     the contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of 
     mediation but a friendly suggestion whether the time was not 
     come when it might be well for the two parties to consider 
     whether the war, however long continued, could lead to any 
     other result than separation; and whether it might not 
     therefore be best to avoid the great evils which must 
     necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by at 
     once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of 
     separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of 
     the contest, however long it may last.

     "The best thing would be that the two parties should settle 
     details by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps 
     with the rancorous hatred now existing between them this 
     might be difficult. But their quarrels in negotiation would 
     do us no harm if they did not lead to a renewal of war. An 
     armistice, if not accompanied by a cessation of blockades, 
     would be all in favour of the North, especially if New 
     Orleans remained in the hands of the North.

     "The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be 
     cleared up by some more decided events between the contending 
     armies...."

     PALMERSTON[768]."

Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in favour of cautious delay. American military events more than Granville's arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there appeared a much more vigorous and determined opponent within the Cabinet. Cornewall Lewis was prompt to express objections. October 2, Russell transmitted to Palmerston a letter of disapproval from Lewis. Russell also, momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote:

     "This American question must be well sifted. I send you a 
     letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ..."

     "My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia 
     holds back. Her separation from our move would ensure the 
     rejection of our proposals. But we shall know more by the 
     16th. I have desired a cabinet to be summoned for that day, 
     but the summons will not go out till Saturday. So if you wish 
     to stop it, write to Hammond[769]."

From this it would appear that Russia had been approached[770] but that Russell's chief concern was the attitude of France, that his proposed private communication to Cowley had been despatched and that he was waiting an answer which might be expected before the sixteenth. If so his expectations were negatived by that crisis now on in the French Ministry over the Italian question prohibiting consideration of any other matter. On October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal retirement from office did not take place until October 24. Several Ministers abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771]. The Emperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that the last time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as soon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a serious consideration of the whole question[772]...." Cowley himself was more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite of previous protestations, was planning "colonizing" Mexico[773].

Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, while wholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever that England might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official or private, to this effect. This did not disturb Russell, who took for granted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused by the doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution of Palmerston. Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand for Ministerial action[774]. Two days of further consideration caused him to return to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:

     "I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the 
     very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest, 
     proposing to North and South to come to terms.

     "Two things however must be made clear:

     (i) That we propose separation,

     (ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked 
     ourselves[775]."

How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not made clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing a memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a mediation on lines of separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind became evident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart, written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for a suggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776]. Russell now thought:

     "If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be 
     adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the 
     North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible 
     course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition 
     if the proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over 
     on the 25th[777]."

British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the Foreign Secretary, having started out on a course portending positive and vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of veering far to one side, if not turning completely about. But the day after Russell seemed to be considering such an attenuation of the earlier plan as to be content with a mere suggestion of armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already troubled waters further and violently disturbing them. This was Gladstone's speech at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was devoted to the Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis had made an army, was making a navy, and had created something still greater - a nation[778]. The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at first glance, indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the intention of forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line earlier adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground. His declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of governmental action. If Jefferson Davis had in truth created a nation then early recognition must be given it. But this surmise of intentional pressure is not borne out by any discovered evidence. On the contrary, the truth is, seemingly, that Gladstone, in the north and out of touch, was in complete ignorance that the two weeks elapsed since his letters from Palmerston and Russell had produced any alteration of plan or even any hesitation. Himself long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention in some form Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make the good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had not yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against the traditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken without authorization and "off his own bat."

The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental policy, immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to indicate a general belief that Gladstone's speech meant action in the war. The price of raw cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm Southern friends and cause them to give assurances that even if the blockade were broken there would be no immediate outpouring of cotton from Southern ports[779]. On the other hand, Bright, staunch friend of the North, hoped that Gladstone was merely seeking to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and Russell to move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your old acquaintance and friend[780]." The leading newspapers while at first accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there was still uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be made clear just what was in the wind[781]. Within the Cabinet it is to be supposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of his unusual procedure and by his sentiments. On Russell, however much disliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect was reinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of the plan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six days after Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a memorandum on America[782].

This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, its power to resist - had maintained a successful defensive; that the notion of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to be wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeing of the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, was no humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in the loyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servile war - a most "terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the Great Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty to propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly the advantages of peace[783]." This was a far cry from mediation and recognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of an armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it about and making it of value. But the memorandum of October 13 does clearly negative what has been the accepted British political tradition which is to the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone's presumption and now determined against action, had "put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in a public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinet decision had as yet been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on October 14. Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that it is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office memorandum of the thirteenth[784]. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to any plan of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and his speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition.

Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather he treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in the Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole ground of British interests. This was the line best suited to sustain his arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinet acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, was his private conviction[785]. At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone must acknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it "to be undecided. Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when it could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of international law that the independence of the Southern States had been established[786]." In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinet decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinet traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally unauthorized, but excusable in the view that the first offence against tradition had forced a rejoinder[787]. For the public Lewis accomplished his purpose and the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788]. Meanwhile Palmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining in uncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult, indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament. This was done through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby was averse to action.

     "He said that he had been constantly urged to go in for 
     recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the 
     ground that recognition would merely irritate the North 
     without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a 
     single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present 
     temper of the Belligerents must be rejected even if the 
     mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair 
     basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having 
     that which the other declared was vitally essential to its 
     existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out 
     the stipulations of a treaty of peace.... The recognition of 
     the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant 
     to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of 
     hostility towards the North[789]."

More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess, fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis was Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed of his male friends[790]." They were in constant communication as the Cabinet crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken immediately after Palmerston's consultation of Derby through Clarendon. October 17, Lewis circulated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell's of October 13. He agreed with Russell's statement of the facts of the situation in America, but added with sarcasm:

     "A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur in the 
     historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war 
     should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between 
     the contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any 
     proposal of the English Government will be made, not by 
     dispassionate bystanders, but by heated and violent 
     partisans; and we have to consider, not how the proposal 
     indicated in the Memorandum ought to be received, or how it 
     would be received by a conclave of philosophers, but how it 
     is likely to be received by the persons to whom it would be 
     addressed."

Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably was intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an argument against, not for, British action, since it revealed an intensity of bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of issues by the belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice the only peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South for the establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediary and sponsor. Any policy except that of the continuance of strict neutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible as yet. Statesmanship required great caution; "... looking to the probable consequences," Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the chances of good, and whether it is not -

     'Better to endure the ills we have 
     Than fly to others which we know not of[791].'"

At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them on the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were received at the Foreign Office and read with interest the reports of a British special agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States. Anderson's reports emphasized three points:

(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed;

(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securing cotton for a long time to come;

(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour of vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being met with enthusiasm[792].

This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or for Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting on Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, still argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harm and might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition "would certainly be premature at present[793]." Russell himself now heard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged to press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on the ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government was the right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet with an insolent rejection of our offer[794]." A long conference with Lyons gave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to the extent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move at present without Russia[795]...." Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for the immediate present, writing to Russell:

     "Your description of the state of things between the two 
     parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much 
     inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no 
     step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition 
     with any advantage."

       * * * * *

     "All that we could possibly do without injury to our position 
     would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree 
     to an armistice but whether they might not turn their 
     thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves. But the 
     answer of each might be written by us beforehand. The 
     Northerners would say that the only condition of arrangement 
     would be the restoration of the Union; the South would say 
     their only condition would be an acknowledgment by the North 
     of Southern Independence - we should not be more advanced and 
     should only have pledged each party more strongly to the 
     object for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined 
     to change the opinion on which I wrote to you when the 
     Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them, and I am 
     very much come back to our original view of the matter, that 
     we must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall 
     have taken a more decided turn[796]."

By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a Cabinet to consider the American question but Russell now postponed it, though a few members appeared and held an informal discussion in which Russell still justified his "armistice" policy and was opposed by Lewis and the majority of those present. Palmerston did not attend, no action was possible and technically no Cabinet was held[797]. It soon appeared that Russell, vexed at the turn matters had taken, was reluctant in yielding and did not regard the question as finally settled. Yet on the afternoon of this same day Adams, much disturbed by the rumours attendant upon the speeches of Gladstone and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell and was informed that the Government was not inclined at present to change its policy but could make no promises for the future[798]. This appeared to Adams to be an assurance against any effort by Great Britain and has been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part. Certainly Adams' confidence was restored by the interview. But Russell was apparently unconvinced as yet that a suggestion of armistice would necessarily lead to the evil consequences prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, require any departure from a policy of strict neutrality. On the one side Russell was being berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing an outworn policy and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europe and of America[799];" on the other he was regarded, for the moment, as insisting, through pique, on a line of action highly dangerous to the preservation of peace with the North. October 23 Palmerston wrote his approval of the Cabinet postponement, but declared Lewis' doctrine of "no recognition of Southern independence until the North had admitted it" was unsound[800]. The next day he again wrote: "... to talk to the belligerents about peace at present would be as useless as asking the winds during the last week to let the waters remain calm[801]."

This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question apparently had come to a conclusion was the result of the unexpected persistence of Russell and Gladstone. Replying to Palmerston's letter of the twenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good could come of a Cabinet, I put it off. But tho' I am quite ready to agree to your conclusions for the present, I cannot do so for G. Lewis' reasons...."

     "G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I never 
     thought of making. He says I propose that England and France 
     and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to 
     suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal.

     "I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and 
     England agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would 
     not do. I thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any 
     specific proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G. 
     Lewis' invention.

     "I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is 
     much pleased[802]."

Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been made by England and France; then Russia was necessary; now "less than five powers would not do." But whatever the number required he still desired a proposal of armistice. On October 23, presumably subsequent to the informal meeting of Cabinet members, he drew up a brief memorandum in answer to that of Lewis on October 17, denying that Lewis had correctly interpreted his plan, and declaring that he had always had "in contemplation" a step by the five great powers of Europe. The advisability of trying to secure such joint action, Russell asserted, was all he had had in mind. If the Cabinet had approved this advisability, and the powers were acquiescent, then (in answer to Lewis' accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definite plans for the negotiation of peace between North and South[803]. Thus by letter to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gave notice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone also circulated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by England, France and Russia[804].

Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by his Cabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell merely putting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though not a member of the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the situation and on October 24 wrote to Lewis:

     "Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American 
     question, which I have read with great satisfaction. Johnny 
     [Russell] always loves to do something when to do nothing is 
     prudent, and I have no doubt that he hoped to get support in 
     his meddling proclivities when he called a Cabinet for 
     yesterday; but its postponement sine die is probably due to 
     your memorandum. You have made so clear the idiotic position 
     we should occupy, either in having presented our face 
     gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive, or in 
     being asked what practical solution we had to propose after 
     an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, that no 
     discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the 
     Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to 
     draw in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street[805]."

On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell's newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again:

     "The Foreign Secretary's blatt exhibits considerable 
     soreness, for which you are specially bound to make 
     allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He 
     had thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out 
     of Vanity, and you have shown his backers that the animal was 
     not fit to start and would not run a yard if he did. He is 
     therefore taken back to the country, where he must have a 
     deal more training before he can appear in public again."

       * * * * *

     "I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as 
     effective in checking the alarm and speculation caused by 
     Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in smashing the 
     Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention, and that you did 
     so without in the smallest degree committing either the 
     Government or yourself with respect to the future[806]."

In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to Russell's complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been secured, but there was still one element of strength for Russell and Gladstone which, if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening of the whole question. This was the desire of France, still unexpressed in spite of indirect overtures, a silence in part responsible for the expression of an opinion by Palmerston that Napoleon's words could not be depended upon as an indication of what he intended to do[807]. On the day this was written the French ministerial crisis - the real cause of Napoleon's silence - came to an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the succession of Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertion of the folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition" was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it should not take place till May Or June next year, when circumstances may show pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right[808]." But this yielding to the Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn when, at last, Napoleon and his new Minister could turn their attention to the American question.

On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in which American affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England, France and Russia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley replied that he had no instructions and Napoleon then modified his ideas by suggesting a proposal of armistice for six months "in order to give time for the present excitement to calm down[809]...." The next day Cowley reported that Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be very anxious to "put an end to the War," but that he was himself doubtful whether it would not be better to "wait a little longer," and in any case if overtures to America were rejected Russia probably would not join Great Britain and France in going on to a recognition of the South[810]. All this was exactly in line with that plan to which Russell had finally come and if officially notified to the British Government would require a renewed consideration by the Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had been going on in London and he now hastened to give the needed French push. October 28, Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of the Emperor's purpose, acting with England, to bring about an armistice[811]. Three days later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he had now been officially informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor's orders" that a despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers in England and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the three powers in suggesting an armistice of six months including a suspension of the blockade, thus throwing open Southern ports to European commerce[812].

Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and was not regarded with favour. He wrote to Russell:

     "As to the French scheme of proposals to the United States, 
     we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets, 
     which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as 
     would be most convenient to you and our colleagues. But is 
     it likely that the Federals would consent to an armistice to 
     be accompanied by a cessation of Blockades, and which would 
     give the Confederates means of getting all the supplies they 
     may want?"

       * * * * *

     "Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of 
     runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal 
     which the Southerns would agree to, and people of England 
     would approve of. The French Government are more free from 
     the shackles of principle and of right and wrong on these 
     matters, as on all others than we are. At all events it would 
     be wiser to wait till the elections in North America are over 
     before any proposal is made. As the Emperor is so anxious to 
     put a stop to bloodshed he might try his hand as a beginning 
     by putting down the stream of ruffians which rolls out from 
     that never-failing fountain at Rome[813]."

But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some sort of proposal to America. He replied to Palmerston:

     "My notion is that as there is little chance of our good 
     offices being accepted in America we should make them such as 
     would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to 
     answer the French proposal therefore by saying,

     "That in offering our good offices we ought to require both 
     parties to consent to examine, first, whether there are any 
     terms upon which North and South would consent to restore the 
     Union; and secondly, failing any such terms, whether there 
     are any terms upon which both would consent to separate.

     "We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it 
     would be essential in our view, that after what has taken 
     place all the slaves should be emancipated, compensation 
     being granted by Congress at the rate at which Great Britain 
     emancipated her slaves in 1833.

     "If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of 
     slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil.

     "This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the 
     Cabinet.

     "It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and 
     probably the South will refuse it[814]."

Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North and South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed them certain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was eager to present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a reversal of the previous decision. Whether from pique or from conviction of the wisdom of a change in British policy, he proposed to press for acceptance of the French plan, with modifications. The news of Napoleon's offer and of Russell's attitude, with some uncertainty as to that of Palmerston, again brought Lewis into action and on November 7 he circulated another memorandum, this time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words. This was in the main an historical resume of past British policy in relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of such cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never recognized a revolted people so long as a bona fide struggle was still going on. Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If England could, by legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing or imperilling her own interests, accelerate this consummation, she would, in my opinion, earn the just gratitude of the civilized world." But the question, as he had previously asserted, was full of grave dangers. The very suggestion of a concert of Powers was itself one to be avoided. "A conference of the five great Powers is an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to set in motion. A single intervening Power may possibly contrive to satisfy both the adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first to satisfy one another." Who could tell what divergence might arise on the question of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might find her ideals or her vital interests compromised[815]?

Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for its appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in international law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was circulated, there appeared a communication in the Times by "Historicus," on "The International Doctrine of Recognition," outlining in briefer form exactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, and advocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality. "Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis' stepdaughter who was also the niece of Clarendon. Evidently the family guns were all trained on Russell[816]. "Historicus" drove home the fact that premature action by a neutral was a "hostile act" and ought to be resented by the "Sovereign State" as a "breach of neutrality and friendship[817]."

Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet crisis was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The French offer was not actually presented until November 10[818]. On the next two days the answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet. Lewis described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating that Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to the effect that Russia would not join but would support English-French proposals through her Minister at Washington, "provided it would not cause irritation[819]."

     "Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain 
     his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the 
     recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable 
     opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen 
     their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France, 
     Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with 
     France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of 
     separating France and England. He therefore advised that the 
     proposal of France should be accepted. Palmerston followed 
     Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal. 
     His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy 
     with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of 
     mitigating it [sic].

     "The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who 
     proceeded to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a 
     stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who 
     supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who 
     expressed no opinion. The principal objection was that the 
     proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a 
     suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly 
     unequal - so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was 
     no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time, 
     Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was 
     against being a party to the representation, and he 
     capitulated. I do not think his support was very sincere: it 
     certainly was not hearty ... I ought to add that, after the 
     Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had 
     been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular 
     sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation, 
     and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support came 
     rather late ... I proposed that we should tater le terrain 
     at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of 
     the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He 
     admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from 
     Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of 
     displeasing France, and that Palmerston's principal motive 
     was a wish to seem to support him. There is a useful article 
     in to-day's Times throwing cold water on the invitation. I 
     take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of 
     the Cabinet[820]."

Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief account:

     "Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again 
     to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the 
     business of America. But I will send you definite 
     intelligence. Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are right. 
     Nov. 12. The United States affair has ended and not well. 
     Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way without 
     resolutely fighting out his battle. However, though we 
     decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in 
     terms which leave the matter very open for the future. Nov. 
     13. I think the French will make our answer about America 
     public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may not 
     take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may 
     themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur 
     with them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to 
     Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821]."

The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in France and in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's "benevolent views and humane intentions," agreed that "if the steps proposed were to be taken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable" but remarked that as yet Great Britain had not been informed that Russia wished to co-operate, and concluded that since there was no ground to hope the North was ready for the proposal it seemed best to postpone any overture until there was a "greater prospect than now exists of its being accepted by the two contending parties[822]." The argument of Russell in the Cabinet had been for acceptance without Russia though earlier he had stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due to the knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse[823]. But in the answer to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an important reason for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis for harmonious decision within the British Cabinet. This is not to say that had Russia acceded England also would have done so, for the weight of Cabinet opinion, adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, was against Russell and the result reached was that which the Premier wished. More important in his view than any other matter was the preservation of a united Ministry and at the conclusion of the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As to the state of matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it smoother[824]."

Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the Cabinet decision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this country against interference[825]," an estimate justified if the more important journals are taken into account but not true of all. The Times of November 13 declared:

     "We are convinced that the present is not the moment for 
     these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that 
     by means of their own internal action the Americans may 
     themselves settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe 
     could settle them for them. We have waited so long that it 
     would be unpardonable in us to lose the merit of our 
     self-denial at such a moment as this.... We quite agree with 
     Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire on 
     turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with 
     the Northern States of America, even with all Europe at our 
     back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon us in 
     defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are 
     as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty 
     or our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as 
     this. We very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia 
     belonged to France as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor 
     of the French would be so active in beating up for recruits 
     in this American mediation league."

This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no English statesman had at any time contemplated an offer of mediation made in such a way as to lead to actual conflict with the United States[826]. On the other hand the Herald, always intense in its pro-Southern utterances, and strongly anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itself unable to credit the rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positively informed that our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed to them," the Herald declared, "we must hope against hope that they are innocent." If guilty they were responsible for the misery of Lancashire (depicted in lurid colours):

     "A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed upon 
     them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and 
     delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, with the 
     task before them and the power to perform it in their 
     hands - can it be that they have shrunk back in craven 
     cowardice, deserted their ally, betrayed their country, 
     dishonoured their own names to all eternity, that they might 
     do the bidding of John Bright, and sustain for a while the 
     infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and a Lincoln[827]?"

In the non-political Army and Navy Gazette the returned editor, W.H. Russell, but lately the Times correspondent in America, jeered at the American uproar that might now be expected against France instead of England: "Let the Emperor beware. The scarred veteran of the New York Scarrons of Plum Gut has set his sinister or dexter eye upon him, and threatens him with the loss of his throne," but the British public must expect no lasting change of Northern attitude toward England and must be ready for a war if the North were victorious[828]. Blackwood's for November, 1862, strongly censured the Government for its failure to act. The Edinburgh for January, 1863, as strongly supported the Ministry and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain to keep out of the war. The Index naturally frothed in angry disappointment, continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a reversal of Ministerial decision, even into the next year. "Has it come to this? Is England, or the English Cabinet, afraid of the Northern States? Lord Russell might contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his country and her ally[829]." An editorial from the Richmond (Virginia) Whig was quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as "two old painted mummies," who secretly were rejoiced at the war in America as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides, and expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both North and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830]. The explanation, said The Index, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimous fear of war - and of a war that would not take place in spite of the bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on[831]." Even as late as May of the year following, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell "a statesman" who belonged "rather to the past than to the present" was primarily responsible for British inaction. "The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless[832]."

The Index never wavered from its assumption that in the Cabinet Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better informed, wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been the only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting the Emperor's proposition[833]?" He had information that Napoleon had been led to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated - so much so that France would now probably act alone[834]. Gladstone's attitude was a sorrow to many of his friends. Bright believed he was at last weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer to France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on American affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was of offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836] - a plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good judgment, save to his correspondent.

In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with the public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America. Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives" were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it would only do harm until there was a change of Government in Washington - an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediation useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837]. Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment of conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in comparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern arguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838]. In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British feeling[839].

The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. It expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather to animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally responsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was no cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specific instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. He wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession intrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forget them[840]." This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared by Adams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that answer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that Great Britain intended no change of policy[841].

So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that ascribed to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons, that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening the retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought on by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and directed at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his resignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused both and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy "I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Seward. We are much more likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a man more disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two years ago[842]." After the event of Seward's retention of office Russell wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]." This is a remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Seward had come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action in the Trent affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone" being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both belief in Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities.

Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to a polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion of armistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. The projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeed destined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in the British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the South was even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must some time come when European recognition would have to be given the Confederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of the war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging the attitude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in evidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations now act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promised good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, in the end, the conviction that now was not a favourable time which determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844].

For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan been adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that Lewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued between England and the North. But also whatever its results in other respects the independence of the South would have been established. Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of life - and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed that Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to servile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon that proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against any future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil War[845].

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 734: Motley, Correspondence, II, 71. To his mother, March 16, 1862.]

[Footnote 735: Ibid., p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 736: The Index first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally a purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the Confederacy.]

[Footnote 737: The Index, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.]

[Footnote 738: e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In his speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided America will be a benefit to England." He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not come to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends. (Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they are not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't say that; don't say that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I am saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."]

[Footnote 739: All American histories treat this incident at much length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F. Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his Life of C.F. Adams, Ch. XV; Studies, Military and Diplomatic, pp. 400-412; Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity, pp. 97-106; A Crisis in Downing Street, Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, May, 1914, pp. 372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motion of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.]

[Footnote 740: Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 388.]

[Footnote 741: U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp. 165-168.]

[Footnote 742: Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 389. First printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.]

[Footnote 743: Ibid., p. 390.]

[Footnote 744: See ante, p. 32.]

[Footnote 745: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862.]

[Footnote 746: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862.]

[Footnote 747: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862. Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that the newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would only make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the next spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Aug. 9-21, 1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offer of mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to open the Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; before leaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture on mediation unless we are ready to go to war." Mercier, however, was eager for action and believed that if France came forward, supported by the other Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled to yield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right (Ibid., Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).]

[Footnote 748: Ibid., Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant.]

[Footnote 749: Ibid., Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22, Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirely political."]

[Footnote 750: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 751: The ignorance of other Cabinet members is shown by a letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, stating as if an accepted conclusion, that there should be no interference and that the war should be allowed to reach its "natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).]

[Footnote 752: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. 18, 1862, fixes the date of Russell's letter.]

[Footnote 753: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 754: Walpole, Russell, II, p. 360.]

[Footnote 755: Ibid., p. 361. Sept. 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 756: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 18, 1862. This is the first reference by Cowley in over three months to mediation - evidence that Russell's instructions took him by surprise.]

[Footnote 757: Gladstone Papers.]

[Footnote 758: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862.]

[Footnote 759: Russell Papers.]

[Footnote 760: Walpole, Russell, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862.]

[Footnote 761: Lyons Papers.]

[Footnote 762: Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862.]

[Footnote 763: Morley, Gladstone, II, p. 76.]

[Footnote 764: See ante, p. 40.]

[Footnote 765: Adams, A Crisis in Dooming Street, p. 393, giving the exact text paraphrased by Morley.]

[Footnote 766: Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entire letter. Sept. 27, 1862.]

[Footnote 767: Ibid., p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributes much influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that the Queen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show that she otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to Russell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have counted for little.]

[Footnote 768: Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter is printed in Walpole, Russell, II, p. 362.]

[Footnote 769: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 770: Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized, (1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delay it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political necessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (Russian Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.) Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of extreme friendship to the United States ( Ibid., F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct. 3, 1862 (O.S.).)]

[Footnote 771: Thouvenel, Le Secret de l'Empereur, II, pp. 438-9.]

[Footnote 772: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 30, 1862.]

[Footnote 773: Ibid., Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, 1862.]

[Footnote 774: Even the Edinburgh Review for October, 1862, discussed recognition of the South as possibly near, though on the whole against such action.]

[Footnote 775: Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston responsible for the original plan and Russell acquiescent and readily agreeing to postpone. This study reverses the roles.]

[Footnote 776: Russell Papers. Also see ante p. 41. Stuart to Lyons. The letter to Russell was of exactly the same tenor.]

[Footnote 777: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 6, 1862. Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to October 25.]

[Footnote 778: Morley, Gladstone, II, p. 79. Morley calls this utterance a great error which was long to embarrass Gladstone, who himself later so characterized it.]

[Footnote 779: Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 402.]

[Footnote 780: Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in the dark as to a Ministerial project. Much of this letter is devoted to the emancipation proclamation which did not at first greatly appeal to Bright as a wise measure.]

[Footnote 781: The Times, October 9 and 10, while surprised that Gladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman, accepted the speech as equivalent to a governmental pronouncement. Then the Timesmakes no further comment of moment until November 13. The Morning Post (regarded as Palmerston's organ) reported the speech in full on October 9, but did not comment editorially until October 13, and then with much laudation of Gladstone's northern tour but with no mention whatever of his utterances on America.]

[Footnote 782: Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17, explaining that he had intended no "official utterance," and pleaded that Spence, whom he had seen in Liverpool, did not put that construction on his words (Gladstone Papers). Russell replied, October 20. "... Still you must allow me to say that I think you went beyond the latitude which all speakers must be allowed when you said that Jeff Davis had made a nation. Negotiations would seem to follow, and for that step I think the Cabinet is not prepared. However we shall soon meet to discuss this very topic" (Ibid.)]

[Footnote 783: Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum were the texts of the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular letter of September 22, and an extract from the National Intelligencer of September 26, giving Lincoln's answer to Chicago abolitionists.]

[Footnote 784: Morley, Gladstone, II, 80, narrates the "tradition." Walpole, Twenty-five Years, II, 57, states it as a fact. Also Education of Henry Adams, pp. 136, 140. Over forty years later an anonymous writer in the Daily Telegraph, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exact details of the "instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited in Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, pp. 404-5.) C.F. Adams,Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity, Ch. III, repeats the tradition, but in A Crisis in Downing Street he completely refutes his earlier opinion and the entire tradition. The further narrative in this chapter, especially the letters of Clarendon to Lewis, show that Lewis acted solely on his own initiative.]

[Footnote 785: Anonymously, in the Edinburgh, for April, 1861, Lewis had written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern sense, and appears never to have accepted fully the theory that it was impossible to reconquer the South.]

[Footnote 786: Cited in Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 407.]

[Footnote 787: Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had characterized Gladstone's speech as an offence against tradition and best practice. Palmerston agreed, but added that the same objection could be made to Lewis' speech. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon, Oct. 20, 1862. Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think this called for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of the falsity of Palmerston's initiative. Ibid., p. 267.]

[Footnote 788: The Index, Oct. 16, 1862, warned against acceptance of Gladstone's Newcastle utterances as indicating Government policy, asserted that the bulk of English opinion was with him, but ignorantly interpreted Cabinet hesitation to the "favour of the North and bitter enmity to the South, which has animated the diplomatic career of Lord Russell...." Throughout the war, Russell, to The Index, was the evil genius of the Government.]

[Footnote 789: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 790: Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 279.]

[Footnote 791: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 792: Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Commons, Vol. I XII. "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America." Nos. 33 and 37. Two reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862. Anderson's mission was to report on the alleged drafting of British subjects into the Northern Army.]

[Footnote 793: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 794: Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct. 19, 1862.]

[Footnote 795: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 20, 1862.]

[Footnote 796: Russell Papers. It is significant that Palmerston's organ, the Morning Post, after a long silence came out on Oct. 21 with a sharp attack on Gladstone for his presumption. Lewis was also reflected upon, but less severely.]

[Footnote 797: Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 265.]

[Footnote 798: U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223. Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C. F. Adams in A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 417, makes Russell state that the Government's intention was "to adhere to the rule of perfect neutrality" - seemingly a more positive assurance, and so understood by the American Minister.]

[Footnote 799: The Index, Oct. 23, 1862. "... while our people are starving, our commerce interrupted, our industry paralysed, our Ministry have no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands, talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and wait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up."]

[Footnote 800: Russell Papers. To Russell.]

[Footnote 801: Ibid., To Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 802: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 803: Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24, 1862."]

[Footnote 804: Morley, Gladstone, II, 84. Morley was the first to make clear that no final decision was reached on October 23, a date hitherto accepted as the end of the Cabinet crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives a resume of talk and correspondence on mediation, etc., and places October 23 as the date when "the policy of non-intervention was informally agreed upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also "complete" (p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others depends in some degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an important interview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but this was copied as October 22 in Bigelow's France and the Confederate Navy, p. 126, and so came to be written into narratives of mediation proposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the correct date. Rhodes' supposition that Seward's instructions of August 2 became known to Russell and were the determining factor in altering his intentions is evidently erroneous.]

[Footnote 805: Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 265.]

[Footnote 806: Ibid., p. 266.]

[Footnote 807: Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, Oct. 24, 1862. Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American affairs.]

[Footnote 808: Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862.]

[Footnote 809: Russell Papers. To Russell.]

[Footnote 810: F.O., France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 28, 1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He approved Drouyn de Lhuys' "hesitation." It appears from the Russian archives that France approached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at Paris, was instructed that while Russia had always been anxious to forward peace in America, she stood in peculiarly friendly relations with the United States, and was against any appearance of pressure. It would have the contrary effect from that hoped for. If England and France should offer mediation Russia, "being too far away," would not join, but might give her moral support. (Russian Archives, F.O. to D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.). No. 320.) On the same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, and was instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but to limit his efforts to approval of any agreement by the North and South to end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of action if (as Gortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly come when both North and South were ready for peace, and it needed but the influence of some friendly hand to soothe raging passions and to lead the contending parties themselves to begin direct negotiations ( Ibid., F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.).)]

[Footnote 811: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29, 1862. Slidell's full report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II, 345.]

[Footnote 812: F.O., France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley thought neither party would consent unless it saw some military advantage. (Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862.) Morley,Gladstone, II, 84-5, speaks of the French offer as "renewed proposals of mediation." There was no renewal for this was the first proposal, and it was not one of mediation though that was an implied result.]

[Footnote 813: Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday, November 1862, was the 10th not the 11th as Palmerston wrote.]

[Footnote 814: Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862.]

[Footnote 815: Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here preserved has the additional interest of frequent marginal comments by Gladstone.]

[Footnote 816: The letters of "Historicus" early attracted, in the case of the Trent, favourable attention and respect. As early as 1863 they were put out in book form to satisfy a public demand: Letters by Historicus on some questions of International Law, London, 1863.]

[Footnote 817: The Times, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter was dated Nov. 4.]

[Footnote 818: Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 819: For substance of the Russian answer to France see ante, p. 59, note 4. D'Oubril reported Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced that the time was inopportune but as stating he had not expected Russia to join. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs was irritated at an article on his overtures that had appeared in the Journal de Petersbourg, and thought himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (Russian Archives. D'Oubril to F.O., Nov. 15, 1862 (N.S.), Nos. 1908 and 1912.)]

[Footnote 820: Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 268. The letter, as printed, is dated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of "yesterday." This appears to be an error. Gladstone's account is of a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11 and 12, with the decision reached and draft of reply to France outlined on the latter date. The article in the Times, referred to by Lewis, appeared on Nov. 13.]

[Footnote 821: Morley, Gladstone, II, 85.]

[Footnote 822: Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 823: F.O., Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to Russell. The same day Napier wrote giving an account of an interview between the French Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in which the latter stated Russia would take no chances of offending the North. Ibid., No. 408.]

[Footnote 824: Morley, Gladstone, II ,85. To his wife, Nov. 13, 1862. Even after the answer to France there was some agitation in the Ministry due to the receipt from Stuart of a letter dated Oct. 31, in which it was urged that this was the most opportune moment for mediation because of Democratic successes in the elections. He enclosed also an account of a "horrible military reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that ten Southerners had been executed because of one Northerner seized by Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers.) The Russell Papers contain a series of signed or initialled notes in comment, all dated Nov. 14. "W." (Westbury?) refers to the "horrible atrocities," and urges that, if Russia will join, the French offer should be accepted. Gladstone wrote, "I had supposed the question to be closed." "C.W." (Charles Wood), "This is horrible; but does not change my opinion of the course to be pursued." "C.P.V." (C.P. Villiers) wrote against accepting the French proposal, and commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan of the South.]

[Footnote 825: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15, 1862.]

[Footnote 826: The Times, Nov. 15, 1862.]

[Footnote 827: The Herald, Nov. 14, 1862. This paper was listed by Hotze of The Index, as on his "pay roll." Someone evidently was trying to earn his salary.]

[Footnote 828: Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to reconcile Russell's editorials either with his later protestations of early conviction that the North would win or with the belief expressed by Americans that he wasconstantly pro-Northern in sentiment, e.g., Henry Adams, in A Cycle of Adams' Letters, I, 14l.]

[Footnote 829: The Index, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 56.]

[Footnote 830: Ibid., Jan. 15, 1863, p. 191.]

[Footnote 831: Ibid., Jan. 22, 1863, p. 201.]

[Footnote 832: Ibid., May 28, 1863, p. 72.]

[Footnote 833: Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28, 1862.]

[Footnote 834: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. 29, 1862. This despatch is not in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, and illustrates the gaps in that publication.]

[Footnote 835: Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 836: Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904, in a speech at a banquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's letter outlining it. The Ottawa Sun, Nov. 16, 1904.]

[Footnote 837: Almost immediately after Lyons' return to Washington, Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that England and France planned to offer mediation and that if this were refused the South would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the Foreign Office: "What good will this do?" It would not procure cotton unless the ports were forced open and a clear rupture made with the North. He thought England understood this, and still hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urge that if all European Powers joined England and France they would be merely tails to the kite and that Russia would be one of the tails. This would weaken the Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit her special relationship with the United States. He was against any joint European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 5-17, 1862, No. 2002.) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this despatch: "Je trouve son opinion tres sage." If Stoeckl understood Lyons correctly then the latter had left England still believing that his arguments with Russell had been of no effect. When the news reached Washington of England's refusal of the French offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised (Ibid., to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170).]

[Footnote 838: Parliamentary Papers, 1832, Commons, Vol. LXXII, "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America." Nos. 47 and 50. Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who had been Stuart's informant about political conditions in New York, felt that he had been deceived by the Democrats. F.O., Am., Vol. 784, No. 38. Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863.]

[Footnote 839: F.O., Am., Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore (Richmond) to Lyons, Dec. 4, 1862. Also F.O., Am., Vol. 844, No. 135. Bunch (Charleston) to Russell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of the "Constitutional hatred and jealousy of England, which are as strongly developed here as at the North. Indeed, our known antipathy to Slavery adds another element to Southern dislike."]

[Footnote 840: Bigelow, Retrospections, I, 579, Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most active of the Northern confidential agents abroad. A journalist himself, he had close contacts with the foreign press. It is interesting that he reported the Continental press as largely dependent for its American news and judgments upon the British press which specialized in that field, so that Continental tone was but a reflection of the British tone. Ibid., p. 443. Bigelow to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.]

[Footnote 841: Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' abilities. He wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense than any of the American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To Russell, Dec. 12, 1862.)]

[Footnote 842: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. 1862.]

[Footnote 843: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, 1863.]

[Footnote 844: December 1, Brunow related an interview in which Russell expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia were in agreement that the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the United States. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressed her proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding and understanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reason for changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1, 1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow knew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France.]

[Footnote 845: Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 as the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this will be shown.]