Northern friends in England were early active in organizing public meetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of January 1, 1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern friends, confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and equally confident that they had with them the great bulk of upper-class opinion in England, at first thought it unnecessary to be active in public expressions aside from such as were made through the newspapers. Up to November, 1862, The Index records no Southern public meeting. But by the summer of 1863, the indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion that something must be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others, especially in the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern sympathy had been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his initiative a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that others were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In Manchester the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist meeting in the Free Trade Hall":

     "These parties are not the rich spinners but young men of 
     energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It 
     appears to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint 
     money in aiding this effort to expose cant and diffuse the 
     truth. Manchester is naturally the centre of such a move and 
     you will see there are here the germs of important work - but 
     they need to be tended and fostered. I have supplied a good 
     deal of money individually but I see room for the use of L30 
     or L40 a month or more[1129]."

The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance the required amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the Confederate secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with the contributions willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of energy with a taste for agitation but little money" reveals a source of support somewhat dubious in persistent zeal and requiring more than a heavy list of patrons' names to keep up a public interest. Nevertheless, Spence succeeded, for a short time, in arousing a show of energy. November 24, 1863, Mason wrote to Mann that measures were "in progress and in course of execution" to hold public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form an association for the promotion of Southern independence "under the auspices of such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., Lord Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay, Peacocke, Van Stittart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and others[1130]...." A fortnight later, Spence reported his efforts and postulated that in them, leading to European intervention, lay the principal, if not the only hope, of Southern independence - a view never publicly acknowledged by any devoted friend of the South:

     "The news is gloomy - very, and I really do not see how the 
     war is to be worked out to success without the action of 
     Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a 
     power that will move the latter, if it can only be stirred 
     up, and that, of course, is public opinion. I had a most 
     agreeable and successful visit to Glasgow upon a requisition 
     signed by the citizens. The enemy placarded the walls and 
     brought all their forces to the meeting, in which out of 
     4,000 I think they were fully 1,000 strong, but we beat them 
     completely, carrying a resolution which embraced a memorial 
     to Lord Palmerston. We have now carried six public meetings, 
     Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, Ashton, Glasgow. We 
     have three to come off now ready, Burnley, Bury, 
     Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work 
     up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the 
     latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon 
     the assembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I 
     think we shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert 
     latent into active sympathy. There is ample power on our side 
     to move the Cabinet - divided as it is, if we can only arouse 
     that power. At any rate the object is worth the 

In the month of November, The Index began to report these meetings. In nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted to heckle the speakers, and usually presented amendments to the address which were voted down. Spence was given great credit for his energy, being called "indefatigable":

     "The commencement of the session will see Parliament flooded 
     with petitions from every town and from every mill throughout 
     the North. A loud protest will arise against the faineant 
     policy which declines to interfere while men of English blood 
     are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and while 
     England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It 
     remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have 
     any effect upon the policy of the Government[1132]."

By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an explanation was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London because it was really a "congeries of cities," with no such solidarity of interests as characterized "the North[1133]." Without London, however, the movement lacked driving force and it was determined to create there an association which should become the main-spring of further activities. Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord Eustace Cecil were made a committee to draft a plan and preliminary address. Funds were now forthcoming from the big blockade-running firms

     "Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a terrific 
     sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause in 
     proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was 
     near saying, but I mean Briton - by offering at once to devote 
     a percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the 
     blockade, to the good of the cause. He has given me at once 
     L500 on account of this - which I got to-day in a cheque and 
     have sent on to Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you 
     see, we are fairly afloat there[1134]."

Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was too late:

     "Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil tidings 
     make uphill work of it - very. Public opinion has quite veered 
     round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The 
     Times correspondent's letters do great harm - more 
     especially Gallenga's - who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York. 
     I have, however, taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat, 
     so he will soon be out again and he is dead for our 

Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European intervention:

     "I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get Europe to 
     move - or some improbable convulsion occur in the North - the 
     end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, impossible 
     that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our 
     Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say: 
     'Oh, what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought 
     back to life two hours after he seemed stone-dead - the 
     efforts at first seemed hopeless, but in case of life or 
     death what effort should be spared[1136]?"

The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those organized by Spence and was the centre for operations in the manufacturing districts. On December 15, a great gathering (as described by The Index) took place there with delegates from many of the near-by towns[1137]. Forster referred to this and other meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts being made by Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American affairs[1138]," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was unquestioned and plans were on foot to bombard with petitions the Queen, Palmerston, Russell and others in authority, but more especially the members of Parliament as a body. These petitions were "in process of being signed in every town and almost in every cotton-mill throughout the district[1139]." It was high time for London, if it was desired that she should lead and control these activities, to perfect her own Club. "Next week," wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be formally launched under the name of "The Southern Independence Association[1140]," and would be in working order before the reassembling of Parliament.

The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the Southern Independence Association were attempts to do for the South what Bright and others had done earlier and so successfully for the North. Tardily the realization had come that public opinion, even though but slightly represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful weapon with which to influence the Government. Unenfranchised England now received from Southern friends a degree of attention hitherto withheld from it by those gentry who had been confident that the goodwill of the bulk of their own class was sufficient support to the Southern cause. Early in the war one little Southern society had indeed been organized, but on so diffident a basis as almost to escape notice. This was the London Confederate States Aid Association which came to the attention of Adams and his friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held at 3 Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty persons and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently an unwelcome guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected by a policeman and got revenge by arranging a demonstration against Mason (who was present), confronting him, on leaving the house, with a placard showing a negro in chains[1141]. There was no "public effort" contemplated in such a meeting, although funds were to be solicited to aid the South. Adams reported the Association as a sort of Club planning to hold regular Wednesday evening meetings of its members, the dues being a shilling a week and the rules providing for loss of membership for non-attendance[1142].

Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862. Possibly its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not intended to appeal to the public[1143]. But the launching of the Southern Independence Association betokened the new policy of constructive effort in London to match and guide that already started in the provinces. A long and carefully worded constitution and address depicted the heroic struggles of the Confederates and the "general sympathy" of England for their cause; dwelt upon the "governmental tyranny, corruption in high places, ruthlessness in war, untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity toward Great Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of America and of the world would be best served by the independence of the South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt by the framers of this constitution to meet that issue. This required delicate handling and was destined to cause some heart-burnings. The concluding section of the constitution read:

     "The Association will also devote itself to the cultivation 
     of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain and of 
     the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily 
     but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition 
     by Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system 
     of servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England, 
     in accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine 
     the gradual extinction of slavery with the preservation of 
     property, the maintenance of the civil polity, and the true 
     civilization of the negro race[1144]."

The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns of heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership fee (one guinea annually) was large enough to attract the elite, but it remained to be seen whether all this equipment would be sent into action. As yet the vigour of the movement was centred at Manchester and even there a curious situation soon arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring that the "Petition to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000 at Ashton, he said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on January 30, 1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade Hall at Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to a halt. "The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall in the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the rent of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass against them[1145]." There must have been truth in the taunt for while The Index in nearly every issue throughout the middle of 1864 reports great activity there, it does not give any account of a public meeting. The reports were of many applications for membership "from all quarters, from persons of rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective counties[1146]."

Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence Association programme. It did appeal to "persons of rank and gentlemen of standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it of these classes it precluded appeal to Radical and working-class England - already largely committed to the cause of the North. Goldwin Smith, in his "Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association," made the point very clear[1147]. In this pamphlet, probably the strongest presentation of the Northern side and the most severe castigation of Southern sympathizers that appeared throughout the whole war, Smith appealed to old Whig ideas of political liberty, attacked the aristocracy and the Church of England, and attempted to make the Radicals of England feel that the Northern cause was their cause. Printing the constitution and address of the Association, with the list of signers, he characterized the movement as fostered by "men of title and family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the North[1148].

It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern Independence Association at Manchester, that The Index, from the end of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single Southern public meeting. The London Association, having completed its top-heavy organization, was content with that act and showed no life. The first move by the Association was planned to be made in connection with theAlexandra case when, as was expected, the Exchequer Court should render a decision against the Government's right to detain her. On January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had arranged for the public launching of the Association "next week," that he had again seen the Chief Baron who assured him the Court would decide "that the Government is entirely wrong":

     "I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the 
     Government persisted in proceeding further, that our 
     Association (which he was pleased to learn had been formed) 
     would take up the matter in Parliament and out of it, for if 
     we had no right to seize these ships, it was most unjust that 
     we should detain them by raising legal quibbles for the 
     purpose of keeping them here till the time arrived when the 
     South might not require them. I think public opinion will go 
     with us on this point, for John Bull - with all his 
     failings - loves fair play[1149]."

It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was thinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the Alexandra[1150], and hoped much from an attack on the Government's policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was to be made to bear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of Parliament. In an Index editorial, Adams was pictured as having driven Russell into a corner by "threats which would not have been endured for an hour by a Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign Secretary as invariably yielding to the "acknowledged mastery of the Yankee Minister":

     "Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is 
     blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark. 
     We can trace his influence in the detention of the 
     Alexandra and the protracted judicial proceedings which 
     have arisen out of it; in the sudden raid upon the rams at 
     Birkenhead; in the announced intention of the Government to 
     alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of this country in 
     accordance with the views of the United States Cabinet. When 
     one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to 
     marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one 
     reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is 
     Earl Russell[1151]."

But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152], the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive home the meaning of the Alexandra decision, carefully avoided urging the Government to change its policy and contented themselves with an effort, very much in line with that initiated by The Index, to belittle Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by the Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries out of war. The Southern Independence Association remained quiescent. Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietus on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern ship-building. Russell's reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going into details, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack on the policy of stopping the ships. He was disgusted with the result of the Alexandra trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration of justice[1153]."

As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiff manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the other were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious and less eager to protest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language. Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of the North. He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament for interposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and South on a basis of Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate debts. Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush rebellion by force of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; (2) the slaves were already free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) "As to the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would never pay a dollar of it[1154]." That there was public animosity to Great Britain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress for ending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid no attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in political manipulation and depending on his opposition to the measure[1155]. Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence by Seward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war of establishing ships off the Southern ports which should collect duties on imports. He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to explain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great Britain. Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a bold Northern defiance to France if she objected[1156]. Adams did discuss the project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of it and in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less a matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British attitude and to learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and France in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainly at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158].

For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now he began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government. As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could be made to see this.

     "... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it 
     worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they 
     are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or 
     lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it. 
     If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New 
     Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates 
     Charleston and Savannah[1159]."

This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon the United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to the warlike power of the North. Similarly the Quarterly Review, long confident of Southern success and still prophesying it, was acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire" must first have passed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864, Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness of the United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a military expert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by the arrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote, often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearing of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons to avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as he ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy Departments[1162]."

Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter already attracting the attention of the British public and causing some anxiety to Russell - the alleged securing in Ireland of enlistments for the Northern forces. The war in America had taken from the ranks of industry in the North great numbers of men and at the same time had created an increased demand for labour. But the war had also abruptly checked, in large part, that emigration from Europe which, since the middle 'forties, had been counted upon as a regular source of labour supply, easily absorbed in the steady growth of productive enterprise. A few Northern emissaries of the Government early sent abroad to revive immigration were soon reinforced by private labour agents and by the efforts of steamship companies[1163]. This resulted in a rapid resumption of emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of Irishmen signed contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental agents) that on arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into the army. The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each recruit. Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal from a few of these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the best he could to secure redress, though the process was usually a long one owing to red-tape and also to the resistance of army officers.

As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered prompt steps were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of State. But the few cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged and encouraged agents of bona fide labour emigration from Ireland, gave ground for accusations in Parliament that Ireland was being used against the law as a place of enlistments. Russell had early taken up the matter with Adams, investigation had followed, and on it appearing that no authorized Northern agent was engaged in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been dropped[1164]. There could be and was no objection to encourage labour emigration, and this was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden increase of the numbers going to America[1165]. But diplomatic and public quiescence was disturbed when the United States war vessel Kearsarge, while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board fifteen Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these men had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well under way the Kearsargesailed into Queenstown again and landed the men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt Adams was quick to give orders for her return. Adams was soon able to disprove the accusation against the consul but it still remained a question whether the commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold defiance of British neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on trial at Cork, pleaded guilty to violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the question of the commander's responsibility was permitted to drop on Adams' promise, April 11, of further investigation[1166].

The Kearsarge case occurred as Parliament was drawing to a close in 1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low ebb. It was not, therefore, until some months later when a gentleman with a shady past, named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in evading British laws and in carrying off to America a group of Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly, forced into the Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject of a Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British law and British honour[1167], but these were rather individual accusations than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making an issue with the Government[1168]. Whenever opportunity arose some inquiry up to July, 1864, would be made intended to bring out the alleged timidity of Russell's policy towards the North - a method then also being employed on many other matters with the evident intention of weakening the Ministry for the great Tory attack now being organized on the question of Danish policy.

In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to one side in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening Danish question which had long been brewing but which did not come into sharp prominence until March. A year earlier it had become known that Frederick VII of Denmark, in anticipation of a change which, under the operations of the Salic law, would come at his death in the constitutional relations of Denmark to Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutional act" to secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The law was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention to hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate from Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German Confederation. The Federal Diet of the Confederation had early protested the purpose of Denmark and Russell had at first upheld the German arguments but had given no pledges of support to anyone[1169]. But Palmerston on various occasions had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour for the Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point of virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions[1170]. A distinct crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when Prussia, under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her, thrust the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumed command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark.

This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's utterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinet colleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the British public as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britain could not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will on Denmark. There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat the Ministry on the score of a humiliating "Danish policy," at one time threatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak and unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres. For three months the Government laboured to bring about through a European council some solution that should both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige. Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark, broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once it became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to the defence of the Danish King.

From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its earlier stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essential bearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe that in it lay a great hope. Having set the Southern Independence Association on its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities, Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new move by Napoleon. Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to other rumours, received privately through Delane of the Times, that an important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172]. Donoughmore, the herald of this glad news also wrote:

     "Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. The 
     Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar 
     the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain 
     in office. If they fail, out they go[1173]."

Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet made clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affect the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the principal confidant and friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary political questions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures. He was soon disgusted with the apathy of the London Independence Association and threatened to resign membership if this organization, started with much trumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a public demand for the recognition of the South[1174]. He had already let it be known that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties. Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a break up of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a meeting of the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary resolution would be considered. The Manchester Association was much more alert and ready to support him. "The question is quite ripe for fresh agitation and from experience I find that that agitation must be started by a debate in Parliament. No notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the provinces[1175]."

Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers began anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer mediation in America. They met with little favourable response. The Times, at the very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its indifference, and recited the situation of October-November, 1862, stating that the question had then been decided once for all. It declared that Great Britain had "no moral right to interfere" and added that to attempt to do so would result in filling "the North with the same spirit of patriotism and defiance as animated the invaded Confederates[1176]." Thus support to Lindsay was lacking in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with Association members had brought a plan of modified action the essential feature of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a party one and that the only hope of the South lay in the existing Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though it was clearly understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay in ministerial desire for and need of support in its Danish policy. Lindsay expected to find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly as regards American policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to Mason on May 27:

     "I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a matter 
     of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in 
     regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am 
     therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On 
     this subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on 
     Monday last and on the same subject we are to have another 
     meeting next Monday; but differences of opinion exist there 
     as well as elsewhere, as to the advisability of moving at 
     present. Some say 'move' - others, 'postpone' - but the news by 
     the Scotia to-morrow will regulate to a considerable extent 
     our course of action. One thing is now clear to me that the 
     motion must not be a party one, and that the main point 
     will be to get the Government to go with whoever brings 
     forward the motion, for as you are aware I would rather see 
     the motion in other hands than mine, as my views on the 
     American question are so well known. As no competent member 
     however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the 
     responsibility, I sent to inquire if it would be agreeable 
     to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on the 
     subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He 
     sent word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had, 
     therefore, a long meeting with him alone last night, the 
     result of which was that if I brought forward a motion 
     somewhat as follows, on the third of June, he would likely be 
     prepared to accept it, though he asked if I would see him 
     again after the Scotia arrived. The motion we talked about 
     was to this effect - 'That the House of Commons deeply 
     regretting the great loss of life and the sufferings of the 
     people of the United States and the Confederate States of 
     North America by the continuance of the war which has been so 
     long waged between them, trust that Her Majesty's Government 
     will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating in 
     conjunction with the other powers of Europe to bring about a 
     cessation of hostilities.'"

Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for Mason to return to England and have a conference with the Premier. To this Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no invitation. Lindsay strongly urged Mason to come over:

     I think much good will follow your meeting Lord Palmerston. 
     It will lead to other meetings
; and besides in other matters 
     I think if you came here, you might at present prove of 
     much service to the South[1177]."

Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence Association permitted the coming forward of a minor London organization called The Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America. A letter was addressed by it to Members of Parliament urging that the time had come for action:

     "215 Regent Street, 
     London, W. 
     May 28th
, 1864.


     "The Society which has the honour to present to you the 
     accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in 
     Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken 
     by the Government of this country in concert with other 
     Powers, to bring about peace on a durable basis between the 
     belligerents in North America.

     "I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you 
     will, before the Session closes, support a motion in 
     Parliament to this effect; and should you desire to see 
     evidence of the feeling of a large portion of the country in 
     this matter, I shall be most happy to lay it before 

Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had stirred the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this letter, following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, is suggestive. The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not at first successful. Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived at in the previous fall, that there was no favour to be expected from Palmerston or Russell and that the only hope rested in their overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay had now taken definite ground. Moreover, Mason had been instructed to shake the dust of England from off his shoes with no official authority to return. Carefully explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined to hold an interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation, or at least suggestion:

     "Had the suggestion you make of an interview and conversation 
     with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I might not 
     have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at once 
     acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to 
     a proposition from you I must with all respect decline it.

     "Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special 
     Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full 
     powers, and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire 
     to see me as his own act (of course unofficially, and even 
     without any reason assigned for the interview) I should have 
     had great pleasure in complying with his request[1179]."

The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the last paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. Lindsay renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated over the seeming success of his overtures to the Government. He had again seen Palmerston and had now pushed his proposal beyond the timid suggestion of overtures when the opportune moment should arrive to a definite suggestion of recognition of the Confederacy:

     "I reasoned on the moral effect of recognition, considering 
     that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly 
     hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc., 
     etc. This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable 
     effect, for he appears now to be very open to conviction. He 
     again said that in his opinion the subjugation of the South 
     could not be effected by the North, and he added that he 
     thought the people of the North were becoming more and more 
     alive to the fact every day."

Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with Russell and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be plain sailing:

     "Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by stern 
     facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that 
     all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, is at an 
. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow. 
     He used to pay some little attention to any opinions I 
     ventured to express to him, and I am not without hope. I 
     may add that I was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has 
     been pleased to be with me, and I told him at parting to-day, 
     that my present intention was not to proceed with the Motion 
     at least for 10 days or a fortnight, unless he was prepared 
     to support me. He highly commended this course, and seemed 
     much gratified with what I said. The fact is, sub rosa, it 
     is clear to me that no motion will be carried unless it is 
     supported by the Government for it is clear that Lord Derby 
     is resolved to leave the responsibility with the Executive, 
     and therefore, in the present state of matters, it would 
     seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward any 
     motion which would not be carried."

Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London.

     "Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, I must 
     earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much 
     wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can 
     do no harm, and may, at the present moment, be of great 
     service to your country

Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would have amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on America, his "gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the parliamentary motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had but recently rebuked for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be interpreted in no other light than an evidence of a desire to prevent Southern friends from joining in the attack, daily becoming more dangerous, on the Government's Danish policy. How much of this Lindsay understood is not clear; on the face of his letters to Mason he would seem to have been hoodwinked, but the more reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much was hoped from the governmental necessity of not alienating supporters. The Danish situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In addition the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over Southern prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in this the Times was again leading[1181]. The Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly issued another circular letter inviting Members of Parliament to join in a deputation to call on Palmerston to urge action on the lines of Lindsay's first overture. Such a deputation would represent "more than 5,000 members and the feeling of probably more than twenty millions of people." It should not be a deputation "of parties" but representative of all groups in Parliament:

     "The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is 
     disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here 
     contemplated and that the weight of an influential deputation 
     would strengthen his hands[1182]."

This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's later objective - namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to be unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary Secretary of the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the Southern Independence Association, finally stirred by Lindsay's insistence, had agreed to join the Society in a representation to Palmerston but had favoured some specific statement on recognition. Palmerston had sent word that he favoured the Society's resolution but not that of the Association, and as a result the joint letter of the two organizations would be on the mild lines of Lindsay's original motion:

     "Although this quite expresses the object of our Society, 
     still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought to 
     have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have 
     consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to 
     bring before Parliament - that of the Independence of the 
     Confederacy - and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the 
     resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be 
     allowed. You know the resolution and therefore I need only 
     quote the obnoxious words 'That Her Majesty's Government will 
     avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc.'

     "This is just leaving the Government where they have been all 
     along. They have always professed to take 'the earliest 
     opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!"

Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among the leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in judgment of where lay the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying his motion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it. Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless it should depict the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern forces[1184]. The day following the Times reported Grant to be meeting fearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy advance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the West[1185]. But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in England was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason understood this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and had come to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the interview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:

     "Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance 
     that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well 
     disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that 
     the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and 
     that neither could union be restored nor the South brought 
     under the yoke.... In regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell 
     said, that he could not accept it, but if brought up for 
     discussion his side would speak favourably of it. That is 
     to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it."

This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the "earliest opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant reception given by Russell scarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South. It must now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was to Mason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was but political manipulation to retain or to secure support in the coming contest with the Tories. The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentary management, were angling for every doubtful vote. Discussing with Lindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured to suggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories, and found him unexpectedly in agreement:

     "I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter, 
     editor of the Herald, had written to Hotze about his 
     connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the 
     latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands 
     and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he 
     would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the pas. 
     Disraeli's accession, as you remember, was contingent upon 
     our success in Virginia - and agreeing entirely with Lindsay 
     that the movement could not be in better hands and as there 
     were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I 
     thought the better policy would be for the present that he 
     should be silent and to await events[1186]."

Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best advantage the South to be rid of Russell:

     "If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful, 
     Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being 
     brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action - if he 
     can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us 
     perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified 

But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a change of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "of course postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]." On June 25, the Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was renewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster followed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental policy as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote was needed[1189].

Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview with Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, it resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that the South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the coming Presidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to have said little.

     "At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that 
     he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt 
     obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the 
     obligation would be increased if I could take with me any 
     expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared 
     to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense 
     that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as 
     I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be 
     better to wait until it had arrived. I told him that my 
     opinion was that the crisis had passed, at least so far as 
     that the war of invasion would end with the campaign[1190]."

Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, Mason wrote:

     "My own impressions derived from the whole interview are, 
     that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the 
     separation of the States is final and the independence of the 
     South an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under 
     the menaces of the North[1191]."

Slidell's comment was bitter:

     "I am very much obliged for your account of your interview 
     with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had 
     anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said 
     even less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has 
     now arrived when it is comparatively of very little 
     importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A 
     plague, I say, on both your Houses[1192]."

Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South had nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should acknowledge the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, The Index expressed much the same view and was equally bitter. It quoted an item in the Morning Herald of July 16, to the effect that Mason had secured an interview with Palmerston and that "the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":

     "The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is said, the 
     result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort of 
     implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment; 
     that is to say, when Grant and Sherman have been defeated, 
     and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition."

In the same issue The Index described a deputation of clergymen, noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished and influential gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge mediation toward a cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at last the joint project of the Southern Independence Association and of the Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America had been put in execution after the political storm had passed and not before - when the deputation might have had some influence. But the fact was that no deputation, unless a purely party one, could have been collected before the conclusion of the Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had no party complexion," and the smiling readiness with which it received Palmerston's jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was to keep strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation itself though harassed by Lindsay and others into making this demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so The Indexwhich sneered at the childishness of Palmerston:

     "... He proved incontestably to his visitors that, though he 
     has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime, he 
     can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by 
     telling them that

     They who in quarrels interpose 
     Will often wipe a bloody nose (laughter) -

     a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the 
     British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as 
     not altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself[1193]."

Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come into personal contact with Palmerston, "even now at his great age a charming contrast to that piece of small human pipe-clay, Lord Russell[1194]." But the whole incident of Lindsay's excited efforts, Mason's journey to London and interview with Palmerston, and the deputation, left a bad taste in the mouth of the more determined friends of the South - of those who were Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they had been deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to London was formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the argument for recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much stress on the break-down of the North. All that was wanted was recognition which was due the South from the mere facts of the existing situation, and recognition, if accorded, would have at once ended the war without intervention in any form[1195]. Similarly The Index stated that mediation was an English notion, not a Southern one. The South merely desired justice, that is, recognition[1196]. This was a bold front yet one not unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, as reported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta had but just started and little was known of the strength of his army or of the powers of Southern resistance. This campaign was therefore regarded as of minor importance. It was on Grant's advance toward Richmond that British attention was fixed; Lee's stiff resistance, the great losses of the North in battle after battle and finally the settling down by Grant to besiege the Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemed to indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war" was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of each of the three preceding years.

Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality practically ended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of June, 1864, but British confidence in Southern ability to defend herself indefinitely, a confidence somewhat shattered at the beginning of 1864 - had renewed its strength by July. For the next six months this was to be the note harped upon in society, by organizations, and in the friendly press.


[Footnote 1129: Mason Papers.]

[Footnote 1130: Ibid.]

[Footnote 1131: Ibid., Spence to Mason, Dec. 7, 1863.]

[Footnote 1132: The Index, Dec. 10, 1863, p. 518.]

[Footnote 1133: The success of pro-Northern meetings in London was ignored. Lord Bryce once wrote to C.F. Adams, "My recollection is that while many public meetings were held all over Great Britain by those who favoured the cause which promised the extinction of Slavery, no open (i.e., non-ticket) meeting ever expressed itself on behalf of the South, much as its splendid courage was admired." (Letter, Dec. 1, 1913, in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Vol. XLVII, p. 55.) No doubt many of these pro-Southern meetings were by ticket, but that many were not is clear from the reports in The Index.]

[Footnote 1134: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Dec. 17, 1863.]

[Footnote 1135: Ibid., The weight of the Times is here evident even though Goldwin Smith's statement, made in a speech at Providence, R.I., in 1864, be true that the London Daily Telegraph, a paper not committed to either side in America, had three times the circulation of the Times. (The Liberator, Sept. 30, 1864.) Smith's speech was made on the occasion of receiving the degree of LL.D. from Brown University.]

[Footnote 1136: Ibid., That Mason did contribute Confederate funds to Spence's meetings comes out in later correspondence, but the amount is uncertain.]

[Footnote 1137: The Index, Dec. 17, 1863, p. 532. "The attendance of representatives was numerous, and the greatest interest was manifested throughout the proceedings. Manchester was represented by Mr. W. R. Callender (Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee), and by Messrs. Pooley, J. H. Clarke, T. Briggs, Rev. Geo. Huntington, Rev. W. Whitelegge, Messrs. Armstrong, Stutter, Neild, Crowther, Stenhouse, Parker, Hough, W. Potter, Bromley, etc. Mr. Mortimer Collins, the Secretary of the Association, was also present. The districts were severally represented by the following gentlemen: Stockport - Messrs. Constantine and Leigh; Rochdale - Mr. Thos. Staley; Bradford - Mr. J. Leach; Hyde - Messrs. Wild and Fletcher; Glossop - Mr. C. Schofield; Oldham - Messrs. Whittaker, Steeple, and Councillor Harrop; Delf and Saddleworth - Mr. Lees, J.P.; Macclesfield - Messrs. Cheetham and Bridge; Heywood - Mr. Fairbrother; Middleton - Mr. Woolstencroft; Alderley (Chorley) - -Mr. J. Beesley, etc., etc."]

[Footnote 1138: So reported by The Index, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 20, in comment on speeches being made by Forster and Massie throughout Lancashire.]

[Footnote 1139: The Index, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 22.]

[Footnote 1140: Mason Papers. To Mason.]

[Footnote 1141: The Liberator, Dec. 26, 1862, giving an extract from the London Morning Star of Dec. 4, and a letter from George Thompson.]

[Footnote 1142: U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Pt. 1, p. 18. Adams to Seward, Dec. 18, 1862, enclosing a pamphlet issued by the Association.]

[Footnote 1143: Its appeal for funds was addressed in part to women. "Fairest and best of earth! for the sake of violated innocence, insulted virtue, and the honour of your sex, come in woman's majesty and omnipotence and give strength to a cause that has for its object the highest human aims - the amelioration and exaltation of humanity."]

[Footnote 1144: The Index, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 23. The committee of organization was as follows: -

     The Most Noble the Marquis of Lothian, 
     The Most Noble the Marquis of Bath, 
     The Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., 
     The Lord Eustace Cecil, 
     The Right Honourable Lord Wharncliffe. 
     The Right Honourable Lord Campbell, 
     The Hon. C. Fitzwilliam, M.P., 
     The Honourable Robt. Bourke, 
     Edward Akroyd, Esq., Halifax, 
     Colonel Greville, M.P., 
     W.H. Gregory, Esq., M.P., 
     T.C. Haliburton, Esq., M.P., 
     A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq., 
     W.S.Lindsay, Esq., M.P., 
     G.M.W. Peacocke, Esq., M.P., 
     Wm. Scholefield, Esq., M.P., 
     James Spence, Esq., Liverpool, 
     William Vansittart, Esq., M.P.

       * * * * *

     Chairman: A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq. 
     Treasurer: The Lord Eustace Cecil. ]

[Footnote 1145: The Liberator, Feb. 26, 1864.]

[Footnote 1146: The Index, March 17, 1864, p. 174. An amusing reply from an "historian" inclined to dodge is printed as of importance. One would like to know his identity, and what his "judicial situation" was. "An eminent Conservative historian writes as follows: 'I hesitate to become a member of your Association from a doubt whether I should take that open step to which my inclinations strongly prompt me, or adhere to the neutrality in public life to which, as holding a high and responsible judicial situation in this country, I have hitherto invariably confined myself. And after mature consideration I am of opinion that it will be more decorous to abide in this instance by my former rule. I am the more inclined to follow this course from the reflection that by not appearing in public as an advocate of the Southern States, I shall be able to serve their cause more effectually in my literary character. And the printing of a new edition of my 'History' (which is now going on) will afford me several opportunities of doing so, of which I shall not fail gladly to avail myself.'"]

[Footnote 1147: Printed, London, 1864.]

[Footnote 1148: At the time a recently-printed work by a clergyman had much vogue: "The South As It Is, or Twenty-one Years' Experience in the Southern States of America." By Rev. T.D. Ozanne. London, 1863. Ozanne wrote: "Southern society has most of the virtues of an aristocracy, increased in zest by the democratic form of government, and the freedom of discussion on all topics fostered by it. It is picturesque, patriarchal, genial. It makes a landed gentry, it founds families, it favours leisure and field sports; it develops a special class of thoughtful, responsible, guiding, and protecting minds; it tends to elevation of sentiment and refinement of manners" (p. 61). Especially he insisted the South was intensely religious and he finally dismissed slavery with the phrase: "The Gospel of the Son of God has higher objects to attain than the mere removal of one social evil" (p. 175).]

[Footnote 1149: Mason Papers.]

[Footnote 1150: The Alexandra, as a result of the Court's decision, was again appealed, but on an adverse decision was released, proceeded to Nassau, where she was again libelled in the Vice-Admiralty Court of the Bahamas, and again released. She remained at Nassau until the close of the war, thus rendering no service to the South. (Bernard, pp. 354-5.)]

[Footnote 1151: Feb. 4, 1864, p. 73.]

[Footnote 1152: See Ch. XIII.]

[Footnote 1153: State Department, Eng. Adams to Seward, April 7, 1864.]

[Footnote 1154: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 81. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 1, 1864.]

[Footnote 1155: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 9, 1864.]

[Footnote 1156: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 98. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 12, 1864.]

[Footnote 1157: Ibid., Vol. 946, No. 201. Lyons to Russell, March 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1158: Ibid., Vol. 945, No. 121. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 23, 1864.]

[Footnote 1159: Lyons Papers, April 23, 1864.]

[Footnote 1160: April, 1864.]

[Footnote 1161: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 19, 1864, and F.O., Am., Vol. 948, No. 284. Lyons to Russell, April 25, 1864. A Captain Goodenough was sent to America and fully confirmed Lyons' reports.]

[Footnote 1162: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1864. The tone of the New York Herald might well have given cause for anxiety. "In six months at the furthest, this unhappy rebellion will be brought to a close. We shall then have an account to settle with the Governments that have either outraged us by a recognition of what they call 'the belligerent rights' of the rebels, or by the active sympathy and aid which they have afforded them. Let France and England beware how they swell up this catalogue of wrongs. By the time specified we shall have unemployed a veteran army of close upon a million of the finest troops in the world, with whom we shall be in a position not only to drive the French out of Mexico and to annex Canada, but, by the aid of our powerful navy, even to return the compliment of intervention in European affairs." (Quoted by The Index, July 23, 1863, p. 203.)]

[Footnote 1163: Bigelow, Retrospections, I, p. 563, states that great efforts were made by the Government to stimulate immigration both to secure a labour supply and to fill up the armies. Throughout and even since the war the charge has been made by the South that the foreign element, after 1862, preponderated in Northern armies. There is no way of determining the exact facts in regard to this for no statistics were kept. A Memorandum prepared by the U.S. War Department, dated July 15, 1898, states that of the men examined for physical fitness by the several boards of enrolment, subsequent to September 1, 1864 (at which time, if ever, the foreign element should have shown preponderance), the figures of nativity stood: United States, 341,569; Germany, 54,944; Ireland, 50,537; British-America, 21,645; England, 16,196; and various other countries no one of which reached the 3,500 mark. These statistics really mean little as regards war-time immigration since they do not show when the foreign-born came to America; further, from the very first days of the war there had been a large element of American citizens of German and Irish birth in the Northern armies. Moreover, the British statistics of emigration, examined in relation to the figures given above, negative the Southern accusation. In 1861, but 38,000 subjects of Great Britain emigrated to the United States; in 1862, 48,000; while in 1863 the number suddenly swelled to 130,000, and this figure was repeated in 1864. In each year almost exactly two-thirds were from Ireland. Now of the 94,000 from Ireland in 1863, considering the number of Irish-American citizens already in the army, it is evident that the bulk must have gone into labour supply.]

[Footnote 1164: Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Commons, LXXII. "Correspondence with Mr. Adams respecting enlistment of British subjects."]

[Footnote 1165: The Times, Nov. 21, 1863. Also March 31, 1864.]

[Footnote 1166: Parliamentary Papers, 1864, Commons, LXII. "Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British seamen at Queenstown." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.]

[Footnote 1167: For facts and much correspondence on the Phinney case see Parliamentary Papers, 1864, Commons, LXII. "Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British subjects in the United States Army." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.]

[Footnote 1168: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIV, p. 628, and CLXXV, p. 353, and CLXXVI, p. 2161. In the last of these debates, July 28, 1864, papers were asked for on "Emigration to America," and readily granted by the Government.]

[Footnote 1169: Walpole, History of Twenty-five Years, Vol. I, Ch. VI.]

[Footnote 1170: In the Cabinet, Palmerston (and to some extent Russell) was opposed by Granville and Clarendon (the latter of whom just at this time entered the Cabinet) and by the strong pro-German influence of the Queen. (Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, Ch. XVI.)]

[Footnote 1171: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, March 13, 1864.]

[Footnote 1172: This came through a letter from Donoughmore to Mason, April 4, 1864, stating that it was private information received by Delane from Mackay, the Times New York correspondent. The expected Southern victory was to come "in about fourteen days." (Mason Papers.)]

[Footnote 1173: Ibid.]

[Footnote 1174: Mason Papers. Lindsay to Beresford Hope, April 8, 1864.]

[Footnote 1175: Ibid., Lindsay to Mason, May 10, 1864.]

[Footnote 1176: July 18, 1864.]

[Footnote 1177: Mason Papers.]

[Footnote 1178: Sample letter in Mason Papers.]

[Footnote 1179: Mason Papers. Mason to Lindsay, May 29, 1864.]

[Footnote 1180: Ibid., Lindsay to Mason, May 30, 1864.]

[Footnote 1181: Editorials of May 28 and 30, 1864, painted a dark picture for Northern armies.]

[Footnote 1182: Mason Papers. Sample letter, June I, 1864. Signed by F.W. Tremlett, Hon. Sec.]

[Footnote 1183: Ibid., Tremlett to Mason, June 2, 1864.]

[Footnote 1184: State Department, Eng., Vol. 86, No. 705. Adams to Seward, June 2, 1864.]

[Footnote 1185: June 3, 1864.]

[Footnote 1186: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 8, 1864. Mason wrote to Benjamin that Disraeli had said "to one of his friends and followers" that he would be prepared to bring forward some such motion as that prepared by Lindsay. (Mason's Mason, p. 500. To Benjamin, June 9, 1864.) Evidently the friend was Hunter.]

[Footnote 1187: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 9, 1864.]

[Footnote 1188: Ibid., Mason to Slidell, June 29, 1864.]

[Footnote 1189: Walpole, History of Twenty-five Years, Vol. I, Ch. VI.]

[Footnote 1190: Mason's Mason, p. 507. Mason to Benjamin, July 14, 1864.]

[Footnote 1191: Mason Papers, July 16, 1864.]

[Footnote 1192: Ibid., To Mason, July 17, 1864.]

[Footnote 1193: The Index, July 21, 1864, p. 457.]

[Footnote 1194: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, July 18, 1864.]

[Footnote 1195: Richardson, II, pp. 672-74. Benjamin to Mason, Sept. 20, 1864.]

[Footnote 1196: July 21, 1864.]